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Abstract 
This paper studies three novel electoral systems and the concept of the electoral region on which 
they are all founded upon. The electoral region is a concept that preserves traditionally 
independent electoral districts but allows them to influence each other’s voting results in order to 
generate greater proportionality in the overall election result. 
The three new and as-yet untested electoral systems presented in this paper are applications of 
the electoral region concept that combine all electoral districts of a country into a single, nation-
wide electoral region for calculating the seat distribution of the national parliament. This allows the 
electoral systems to distribute seats among parties as if there was only one nation-wide electoral 
district while still maintaining any number of electoral districts as vehicles of regional 
representation. If applied to federal elections, the electoral region concept would similarly permit 
individual states to elect their own representatives while ensuring that the overall seat distribution 
between parties at the federal level remains as perfectly proportional as the size of the 
representative body allows. 
Using Finland’s parliamentary elections of 2007 as a test case, this paper proves that the electoral 
region concept allows a degree of proportionality that is either on par with or greater than in any 
earlier system of proportional representation. As the three electoral systems presented 
demonstrate, this unmatched level of proportionality is achievable with a method that is far simpler 
than the multi-tiered systems that have thus far been required for achieving similar levels of 
proportionality in multi-district elections; Two of the three electoral systems introduced in this paper 
utilize only one electoral formula in their seat distribution from the national level down to the 
districts – the widely adopted d’Hondt formula – and in all three the voter is only expected to cast a 
single vote in favor of a single candidate and party. 
Keywords 
Elections, electoral system, electoral reform, electoral region, Finland, proportionality, proportional 
representation, d’Hondt, Sainte-Laguë, Hare-Niemayer, district magnitude  
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1. Introduction 
Parliamentary election reform has been a periodically debated topic in Finland over the past 
several decades, surfacing typically just before and after elections. Although the parties in 
parliament have from time to time agreed on its necessity, they have never managed to agree on 
the manner in which it should be executed. As a result, the electoral system has remained 
unchanged despite its recognized flaws and the many proposals that have been made to fix them.1 
The electoral system that a country uses matters because it translates the voting result into a 
political outcome and ultimately decides the balance of power between political factions. As we will 
see later on, even relatively small changes in the electoral system can lead to a significantly 
different political outcome even when the voting result itself doesn’t change. How voters can 
express their opinion, what practical choice they have in the voting booth and how their vote 
actually influences the outcome all depend to a large extent on the qualities of the electoral 
system. Electoral systems therefore have a hugely important role in the democratic process.2 
Finland uses a system of proportional representation (PR) that aims to produce a political outcome 
where the seat shares of all parties in parliament would closely match with their share of the 
popular vote. To do this, the system utilizes the d’Hondt formula to elect representatives from 14 
separate districts. The often recognized problem of the system is that it favors large3 parties at the 
expense of smaller ones when it allocates parliamentary seats to parties based on their vote 
counts. This means that large parties get a disproportionate share of seats relative to their vote 
tally. In other words, they get more seats in parliament than their share of the votes would justify if 
the seat allocation was perfectly proportional.4 This disproportionality is caused by the combination 
of several small electoral districts with the mathematical qualities of the d’Hondt formula, the details 
of which we will return to a bit later. For now it is sufficient to be aware of the effect, which is more 
pronounced the smaller5 a district gets. 
                                                          
1 Ylisalo, Maunula & Helin 2012. 
2 Gallagher & Mitchell 2006, pp. 3–5. 
3 As measured by their electoral support, i.e. the most popular parties. 
4 “Perfect” proportionality is understood here and throughout the thesis as a situation where every party’s 
seat share is precisely equal to its share of votes, i.e. where a party that gets 17.2 % of the vote also gets 
17.2 % of the seats. 
5 Throughout this paper whenever I refer to the size of a district I mean only the number of representatives 
elected from that particular district. This is also known as district magnitude (M). The size of the district does 
not therefore refer to geographical size, population or any other quality of the district besides the number of 
representatives it elects. 
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The practical consequence of this bias against small parties is that in districts with less than ten 
elected representatives it becomes exceptionally difficult for small parties to get candidates elected 
– even when an individual candidate of theirs would win the most votes of any candidate in the 
district. Conversely, the party that gets the most votes in a district is almost guaranteed to get more 
than its “fair share” of seats in that particular district, while others are left underrepresented relative 
to their vote shares. 
Though such an outcome is not automatically a problem in need of a fix – some countries have 
indeed found it to be a desirable feature of an electoral system – it becomes problematic in light of 
the explicitly stated principle of proportional representation that is laid bare, in no uncertain terms, 
in both the election law and the Constitution of Finland: parties should have the same percentage 
of seats in parliament as they had of votes.6 
Another problem in the current system is the hidden threshold of exclusion imposed by the d’Hondt 
formula, which varies wildly from one district to another depending on district size, causing regional 
inequality that can manifest itself in further disproportionality. In practice this means that in districts 
with only a few seats up for grabs, the share of votes required to win a seat is much higher than in 
larger districts. A party whose voter base is mainly in small districts will therefore find it much 
harder to get candidates elected than a party with an equal number of voters but in larger districts. 
This creates significant discrepancies in seat allocation between parties whose support is 
geographically focused and those who enjoy nation-wide support.7 
Reform of the electoral system has entered the political discourse in Finland several times during 
the past decade alone.  Concrete steps were taken after the 2003 and 2007 elections as the 
Ministry of Justice set up working groups to come up with proposals for the reform. These have 
produced a number of suggestions for improving proportionality and regional equality. These 
include proposals to combine smaller electoral districts into fewer larger ones, allocating a portion 
of the parliamentary seats through a compensatory seat allocation scheme, legislating fixed 
thresholds of exclusion, changing the mathematical formula used from d’Hondt to an alternative 
formula, and adopting entirely new methods of voting.8 However, even though most parties have 
                                                          
6 Election Act 714/1998, 6 § (Vaalilaki 2.10.1998/714, 6 §); The Constitution of Finland 731/1999, 25 § 
(Suomen perustuslaki 11.6.1999/731, 25 §). See also OMTH 2002:15, 1. 
7 See for instance Borg & Paloheimo 2009, pp. 243–276. 
8 See for instance Yle 2001a & 2002a; Ministry of Justice 2001; OMKM 2005:1. 
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for long agreed on the necessity of electoral reform and its goals in principle, they haven’t been 
able to agree on the specifics of what exactly should be reformed and how.9 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce an alternative solution to those already proposed and 
studied; a new electoral system that (1) produces unparalleled proportionality between parties on 
the national level, (2) grants no advantage or disadvantage to parties whose support is 
geographically focused, and (3) is simpler than other alternatives that could produce a similar 
overall degree of proportionality. 
                                                          
9 See for instance Yle 2007a; Ylisalo, Maunula & Helin 2012. 
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2. Proportionality 
The proportionality of an election result is a relatively simple and intuitive concept. It is the measure 
to which a party’s seat share corresponds to its vote share. Measuring proportionality in practice is, 
however, slightly more complicated. The exact measure of proportionality can be given multiple 
definitions and it can be measured on multiple levels.10 
Proportionality is perhaps most commonly used to refer to the allocation of seats of a 
representative body between parties. This is often the most relevant and meaningful level of 
analysis in analyzing the overall political outcome of an election between parties. In most electoral 
systems, however, that overall outcome is little more than a combination of multiple partial 
elections, such as when two different and complementary electoral systems are used in the same 
election or when elections are organized independently in multiple sub-national districts. In such 
cases the overall political outcome is not particularly revealing about how the electoral system 
actually functions. Where independent electoral districts11 are used it is also necessary to study 
proportionality and seat allocation at the district level. Otherwise the factors that influence the 
overall result and its proportionality, or lack thereof, cannot be properly understood. Analyzing the 
results at the district level is especially relevant when, as is the case in Finland, the districts are 
intended as vehicles for regional representation. 
When analyzing the proportionality of the overall political outcome – that is, the seat allocation 
between parties at the highest, usually national, level – it is important to note that no electoral 
system is going to consistently guarantee ‘perfect’ proportionality. Every electoral system is prone 
to produce some level of deviation from perfect proportionality, if for no other reason than the 
practical impossibility of allocating fractions of a single seat to different parties.12 It is highly unlikely 
that the number of votes cast is evenly divisible by the number of seats. Further, the number of 
seats is bound to be limited by practical considerations and it will therefore be practically 
impossible to guarantee representation to every marginal group that had one or more candidates 
and received one or more votes. That said, some electoral systems can get much closer to that 
elusive ‘perfect’ proportionality than others. 
                                                          
10 See for instance Maunula 2008, pp. 30–37. 
11 An “independent district” here meaning a district whose voting result does not influence calculations 
beyond that district’s borders and whose seat allocation is not influenced by voting in other districts. 
12 See for instance Lijphart 1994. 
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2.1. Why does proportionality matter? 
Alan Renwick has identified the democratic values that relate to electoral system design in a 
representative democracy: A fair distribution of seats and power, avoidance of anomalous results, 
representation of society, voter choice, accountability of governments and individual politicians, 
checks and balances, enabling effective political parties, and simplicity. At the same time the 
electoral system should enable efficient decision-making and effective governance.13 While all of 
these traits relate to proportionality, some of them do so more directly than others. 
When it comes to enabling effective political parties and the distribution of seats and power, there 
is a strong case to be made that perfect proportionality may not always be a desirable outcome 
from the point of view of a functioning democracy: A highly fragmented representative body does 
not easily lend itself to effective governance or political stability.14 This is especially true under 
parliamentarian systems of government where the parliament is expected to elect a cabinet and a 
prime minister. It may therefore be favorable to have an electoral system that, although to some 
extent proportional, favors larger parties over smaller ones so that there will be fewer but larger 
parties in the parliament, and that the parliament as a whole remains less fragmented. In addition, 
as Renwick points out, a perfectly proportional seat distribution may not be in line with “fairness” or 
proportionality in the distribution of power: If no single party holds the majority of seats in 
parliament, small parties with just a few seats may end up wielding legislative power that far 
exceeds their number of seats (and votes).15 
Therefore it is not surprising that even though all electoral systems necessarily impose some 
thresholds for gaining representation that limit the ability of smaller factions to have their 
candidates elected, some electoral systems are purposefully designed with that effect in mind. 
While some countries utilize an explicit and legally fixed threshold, in others the threshold is simply 
a determinant of the electoral system used. Some systems are however designed with features 
whose express purpose is to increase the threshold of votes required to win a seat.16 They are, in 
effect, engineered to limit the number of parties in parliament, prioritizing effective governance over 
“fair” or proportional seat distribution.17 This means that when studying the proportionality of 
electoral systems it is not enough to measure proportionality only between parties in parliament, 
but also vis-à-vis parties seeking representation but failing to have their candidates elected. 
                                                          
13 Renwick 2010, pp. 38–42. 
14 Maunula 2008, pp. 30–37. See also Gallagher & Mitchell 2006, pp. 590–591. 
15 Renwick 2010, pp. 39–40. 
16 See for instance Farrell 2001, pp. 12–18; Renwick 2010, p. 42. 
17 For discussion about the “effective number of parties” under different electoral systems, see for instance 
Taagepera 2007. 
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While some limits to proportionality are unavoidable and indeed even desirable, at the other end of 
the scale we have outcomes whose sheer disproportionality makes them undesirable – even to the 
point where they are a direct affront to democratic principles:18 Too great of a disparity between a 
party’s electoral support and its share of the seats in the parliament can call the legitimacy of the 
entire system into question. 
Many electoral systems of course boost the seat share of the winning party above and beyond its 
proportional share of the vote. In many cases this is entirely intentional, as the objective is to 
ensure the election has a clear victor who can proceed to form a strong, stable government without 
the fear of constant legislative gridlock with opposition parties. In extreme cases such a system 
can be wildly disproportional, as a party winning only the largest minority of votes can win the 
majority of seats – yet that would still be in line with the general principle that the party getting the 
most votes will also get the most seats. If disproportionality in the electoral system is too extreme, 
however, a party could win more seats than its competitors with fewer votes. While such an 
outcome may sound too absurd to occur in practice, the phenomenon is anything but unheard-of.  
Such an “anomalous result” was perhaps most notoriously witnessed in the U.S. presidential 
election of 2000, where George W. Bush won a majority of Electoral College seats and was 
elected President despite having received fewer votes than his rival candidate Al Gore. Needless 
to say, such an outcome begs the question if the result truly represents the views of the voters. 
After all the whole purpose of democratic elections is to give the voters a choice over candidates 
running for office – if the outcome then conflicts with the choice made by the voters, a person 
would be right to ask what was the point in having the election in the first place. 
Though it would seem an aberration that an electoral system would grant more seats to a party 
with fewer votes than its rivals, such a phenomenon occurred even in the 2007 parliamentary 
elections of Finland – although it didn’t stir up quite the fuss of the U.S. presidential election 
aftermath seven years before it, even in Finland. In the election the Swedish People’s Party won 
over a quarter more seats than the Christian Democrats despite the Christian Democrats receiving 
6.5 percent more votes than the Swedish People’s Party.19 Although in practical terms the 
deviation from proportionality was in this case politically rather insignificant (unlike in the U.S. 
presidential elections of 2000), such outcomes are hardly representative of the expressed will of 
the voters or conducive to their ability to hold the government and individual parties democratically 
accountable. Whatever the benefits of some deviation from ‘perfect’ proportionality, there is thus a 
                                                          
18 Renwick 2010, pp. 39–40. 
19 The Swedish People’s Party won 9 seats over the 7 won by the Christian Democrats, i.e. 28.6% more. 
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point at which excess disproportionality causes legitimate problems and starts to run counter to 
democratic principles.20 Upon designing new electoral systems we must guard against the 
possibility of such extreme deviations. 
Most systems of proportional representation are of course compromises enabling some degree of 
proportionality while attempting to prevent too much fragmentation. Some systems are geared 
more towards producing a clear winner; a party that will gain a majority of the seats either on its 
own or at least by forming only a narrow coalition. Others are more likely to produce multiple 
medium-sized parties that have to rely on one another in order to form a broad coalition or in order 
to sustain a minority government. 
Either way the electoral system that a country chooses is immensely important, as different 
electoral rules can translate the same voting result into vastly different political outcomes. Rein 
Taagepera has observed that “electoral systems can sometimes make or break a party – or even a 
country”.21 The same vote-tally can be translated into an absolute majority for a single party just as 
easily as it can establish a situation where no two parties combined can command a majority of 
seats. Taagepera cites multiple examples from Chile to Palestine where a different electoral 
system, not a different voting result, would have led to a vastly different course of history for that 
country and even for its region.22 The lesson: electoral systems matter. 
2.2. Beyond proportionality 
Electoral systems based on proportional representation aren’t the only game in town. There are 
nearly as many ways to organize elections for parliament as there are countries, and proportional 
representation isn’t by any means the default approach even for countries designing their electoral 
systems from scratch.23 
Some systems, like Britain’s, are deliberately engineered so as to not produce a proportional seat 
distribution among parties in parliament; instead they act as vehicles to produce decisive majorities 
(and typically two-party duopolies24). Sometimes proportionality is not a feasible goal to begin with, 
as in Afghanistan where, in the beginning of the 21st century, political parties were either non-
                                                          
20 Renwick 2010, pp. 38–39. 
21 Taagepera 2007, p. 3. 
22 Taagepera 2007, pp. 1–2. 
23 For a listing of different electoral systems available and used in the world today, see for instance 
Taagepera 2007, pp. 23–46; and Taagepera & Shugart 1989, 20–36, 127–133. The broad range of 
alternatives and the multitude real-world examples thereof are also discussed in Lijphart 1994; Paloheimo 
2008; and Renwick 2010. 
24 See for instance Taagepera & Shugart 1989, 77–91, 117–125. 
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existent or had long ago morphed from political factions to paramilitary organizations.25 Therefore it 
was deliberately decided that the country’s new electoral system would neither promote strong 
majorities nor proportionality; in the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system it adopted, each 
voter casts a single vote for a single candidate in a multi-member constituency where a pre-
determined number of candidates who received the most votes get elected into parliament. SNTV 
is perhaps the simplest electoral system imaginable, but it is also one that doesn’t encourage the 
formation of parties as the system offers candidates no benefit from cooperation with one another. 
In a way the electoral systems of Afghanistan and Britain are polar opposites in that the former 
minimizes the influence of parties in both elections and in legislation while the latter maximizes the 
power of a single ruling party by creating an effective two-party system.26 The British electoral 
system is, however, only a special case of SNTV called the first past the post (FTPT) system, 
where single-member constituencies are used in place of the multi-member constituencies of 
Afghanistan; instead of electing multiple representatives from a single district, in FTPT only a 
single representative per district is elected into office. This gives voters a strong incentive not to 
‘waste’ their votes on anyone but a handful of most likely winners, which, combined with the 
parallel incentive of discouraging competition among like-minded candidates, over time leads to 
the formation of an effective two-party system.27 
The problem with both the SNTV and FTPT systems is that all votes cast in favor of candidates 
that do not personally get elected are essentially ‘wasted’ votes. This can be avoided with the 
adoption of a system of party-list proportional representation, such as the ones discussed in this 
paper, where votes cast to losing candidates will still benefit other candidates of the same party. 
Combined with multi-member constituencies this feature massively expands voter choice over both 
candidates and parties, as it permits voters to consider voting even less likely winners without the 
fear of tossing their vote away without having influenced the final election result one bit. 
Party lists and proportional representation aren’t the only way to avoid wasted votes, however. 
From the point of view of voter choice focusing on proportionality between parties may not even be 
                                                          
25 Smith 2014. 
26 Yes, there are more than two parties in the British parliament, but in most single-member constituencies 
there are always, in the end, only two viable candidates worth considering unless the voter wants to take an 
almost certain risk of wasting his or her vote. Typically this district-level two-party system also results in an 
effective two-party system in parliament, where only one of two parties is able to form a government. See for 
instance Taagepera & Shugart 1989, pp. 21, 77–91. 
27 Taagepera & Shugart 1989, pp. 21, 77–91, 117–125. 
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desirable;28 by doing so we make the tacit assumption that voter opinion is best expressed through 
parties. But it should not be taken for granted that voters even want to be represented by parties. 
Voters may well prefer to elect trusted individuals rather than impersonal party platforms.29 To 
reflect that, an electoral system could emphasize the choice between individual candidates over 
the choice between parties. Apart from the SNTV and FTPT systems, one such alternative is the 
single-transferable vote (STV), which, as its name suggests, allows a vote to be “transferred” to 
another candidates should the voter’s first choice not get elected. 
In STV each voter is expected to craft a list of several candidates in order of preference. Should 
the voter’s first choice not receive enough votes to get elected, the vote is transferred to whichever 
candidate the voter had ticked second or third or however far down on the ballot. This allows voters 
more freedom of choice as the candidates listed by a voter do not necessarily need all be from the 
same party, whereas in a party-list system the vote would automatically count for any and all other 
candidates of the same party. Consequently the STV system lessens the influence of parties; while 
party-list systems promote the role of parties over individual candidates, STV promotes individual 
candidates over parties.30 
STV thus gives more freedom of choice to the voter than electoral systems based on party lists 
and proportionality between parties, while avoiding “wasted” votes just the same. This has led 
some to dub the STV as the “best” electoral system, as it permits the voter the most choice 
between individual candidates over any party lines and regardless of how many parties are 
contesting the elections.31 
However, such a system would arguably be more arduous to the voter than casting a single ballot 
to a single party or candidate, as it would require voters to rank multiple candidates in an order of 
preference. Party-list systems offer a simpler method of voting, where the voter may cast his or her 
vote in favor of a party without a strong preference over, or even any knowledge of, its individual 
candidates. At the same time the use of party-lists avoid too many votes from going to waste 
without having any influence on who actually gets elected, unlike the equally simplistic SNTV 
                                                          
28 Indeed, even party-list PR systems can be seen as limiting voter choice by encouraging “strategic” voting, 
as voters may not wish to cast their vote in favor of all candidates of a particular party even if they like some 
of its candidates. On the other hand, as Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart have observed specifically in 
Finland, parties may not even register any candidates in districts where they are very unlikely to gain seats. 
Taagepera & Shugart 1989 pp. 24, 120. 
29 Renwick 2010, pp. 30–31, 40; Taagepera & Shugart 1989, p. 21. 
30 Taagepera and Shugart have argued that a closed-list PR system “gives more power […] to the parties’ 
central leadership than any other democratic electoral system”. By contrast they state that the STV system 
“gives maximum freedom to voters and minimum control to party leaders”. Taagepera & Shugart 1989, pp. 
24, 27. 
31 Taagepera & Shugart 1989, p. 27. 
10 
system. I would therefore argue that there is no such a thing as a universally “best” electoral 
system – all electoral systems are compromises between various desirable and less desirable 
traits. Both individualistic and party-centric electoral systems have their merits and both can serve 
voter interest well. 
All of these four basic electoral systems – SNTV, FTPT, party-list PR and STV – come in a 
dizzying selection of variations as each country has sought to adapt them into their particular 
political environment with modifications, additions, combinations, restrictions and exceptions 
thereof. Party-list systems alone come in countless variations with differing mathematical formulas 
and other rules stacked one atop another. This paper focuses only on systems of party-list 
proportional representation and specifically on four variations thereof: one that has seen wide 
usage around the world and three new and untested ones. However, acknowledging the 
arguments for voter choice beyond a simple party choice, proportionality will not be the only focus 
of this thesis. Open-list systems such as that used by Finland already allow voters to express their 
preference over individual candidates on a party list. How that preference is taken into 
consideration in the various proposed and existing open-list systems is worth looking into. One of 
the aspects we will look at in this paper is therefore whether one of the studied systems grants the 
voter more influence over individual candidates than another. This is a question that has, in my 
view, been given way too little attention in comparative studies of electoral systems, even though 
Taagepera and Shugart reminded us of its importance over two decades ago.32 The Ministry of 
Justice electoral region working group appointed to study electoral system alternatives for Finland, 
for instance, paid no attention to this question in its final report.33 We will return to this topic in 
Chapter 9. 
                                                          
32 Taagepera & Shugart 1989, pp. 213-241. See also Renwick 2010, p. 40. 
33 OMKM 2008:2. 
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3. Research methods 
We will compare the existing electoral system used in Finland to three novel alternatives that have 
never been used or tested in real-world elections: one developed and proposed by the Ministry of 
Justice electoral region working group34 and two variants of a method I developed previously as 
part of my Bachelor’s Thesis at the University of Tampere. The Ministry of Justice proposal has 
been selected for the comparison because it is both the most recent proposal that has been 
officially considered for adoption in Finland and because it offers the greatest improvement to 
national-level proportionality of all known alternatives that do not require changes to existing 
electoral districts. 
I will use the voting results of the Finnish parliamentary elections of 2007 to calculate and present 
the political outcomes produced by each system in order to measure the level of proportionality of 
the results. Following an analysis of the national level results we will turn to give the same 
treatment to district level results, and analyze their proportionality as well as how the different 
electoral systems influence the election of individual candidates. For the measurements of 
proportionality I will use different established indices of disproportionality that I will outline in detail 
in Chapter 3.2 as well as in Appendix C. 
3.1. Electoral data 
The basis for calculating comparable outcomes for the different electoral systems will be the voting 
data of the 2007 Finnish parliamentary elections, as collected and published by the national 
broadcasting company Yle.35 I will use Yle as my data source of choice as its online election 
service provides the electoral data, such as vote counts for each individual candidate, in a more 
readable and easily editable format than the official Ministry of Justice website. By using the Yle 
data I acknowledge and accept the risk that there may be errors in the data presented, courtesy of 
Yle. For the purposes of this paper and its conclusions any such errors will not however be 
meaningful, as the data is used for comparative purposes only and all comparisons are based on 
the same data set. In any case a cursory comparison to the official Ministry of Justice data will 
show that any errors the Yle data might contain are minor enough to not alter the overall election 
outcome. 
                                                          
34 In Finnish: Vaalialuetoimikunta. In Swedish: Valområdeskomission. 
35 Yle 2007b. 
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The main reason for using real-world data rather than imagined figures is to provide a more 
meaningful comparison that is relevant to the existing political parties. The significance of the 
proposed changes and the extent to which they would alter the current political balance is easier to 
demonstrate with a real-world example than with an artificial voting scenario. It also makes it easier 
for politicians and government officials alike to assess the implications of the proposed reforms. 
That purpose would permit us to use the voting results of any election for which data is still 
available, but the 2007 voting result is a convenient choice for two reasons. First, it is still relatively 
recent at the time of this writing and thus relevant to highlighting how the proposed changes in the 
electoral system would affect the current parties in parliament. Second, the 2007 outcome very 
clearly demonstrated some of the faults of the current electoral system, making it a useful 
benchmark for testing whether any of the proposed alternatives would actually correct those faults. 
While the results of the 2011 parliamentary elections would be more recent and as such an 
arguably more interesting basis for comparison, the political outcome of that particular election did 
not make the faults of the system quite as easily observable as did the 2007 outcome. 
Finally, the field of Finnish parties is almost as perfect a test-bed for comparing electoral systems 
as the most carefully crafted artificial simulation. Among the Finnish parties are several large 
parties that are always in tight competition over the crown of the largest party, but also multiple 
medium-sized and small parties that vie for seats in each election, competing not only against each 
other but also successfully challenging and sometimes even beating the larger parties in some 
districts. There are also marginal parties that are just on the verge of gaining representation and 
who might, with a slightly different electoral system, manage to gain the representation they have 
so far failed to gain in real life. Finally, there is one medium-sized party whose voter base is 
geographically so intensely focused that it doesn’t even contest the election in all districts; it serves 
as the perfect test-case for how different electoral systems treat parties that may not enjoy broad 
national appeal but who are very popular in a limited geographical area – as might happen with 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities in any country. 
The use of real-world electoral data is made possible by the very similar nature of the four systems 
that we are about to compare, as they all utilize the same voting mechanism and the same basic 
method of party-list proportional representation. This allows us to assume with a high degree of 
confidence that the change from one electoral system to another does not, for our comparative 
purposes, significantly alter voter behavior at the polls. Since each vote cast in each of the systems 
will still benefit the party it was cast in favor of even if the individual candidate on the ticket failed to 
get elected, the voters have no reason to radically reconsider their voting options – as they would 
have to if an STV or SNTV system was adopted instead. As we will discuss later, the only added 
voter incentive with any of the new models is that voters may become more encouraged to vote 
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smaller parties even in districts where they haven’t been able to win representation before. But this 
change, while entirely realistic and to some extent even likely in practice, is not likely to be 
significant enough to render our comparison on overall system proportionality obsolete. 
3.2. Measuring proportionality 
In order to have a meaningful and accurate comparison of the proportionality of the election results 
of different electoral systems, it is necessary to have a numerical measure of proportionality. 
Fortunately several indices have been developed for just such a purpose. 
Douglas Rae devised a formula that measures (dis)proportionality by calculating the average 
deviation between the parties’ shares of votes and their shares of seats. The numerical value of 
Rae’s index (I) thus tells us how many seats too many or too few each party gained, on average. 
The index is calculated with the formula: 
 
i
sv
I
ii 
 , where vi is a party’s vote share, si its seat share and i the number of parties.36 
Example:  If the Rae index gives the value I=2, then on average the share of the seats won by each 
party is two percentage points higher or lower than their share of the votes. 
Rae’s index is however sensitive to the number of parties: When the election is contested by many 
parties with marginal vote shares, and if those parties are not specifically excluded from the count, 
the index tends to give misleading results. 
An alternative formula that is less sensitive to the number of parties has been developed by John 
Loosemore and Victor Hanby.  Their formula measures the aggregate overrepresentation of all 
those parties that gained a larger share of seats than they did of votes. The numerical value given 
by the Loosemore–Hanby index (D) is then understood as the percentage of seats that were 
‘misallocated’ to ‘wrong’ parties above their proportional share. Thus it is perhaps intuitively an 
easier figure to grasp than the average deviation of the Rae index. The Loosemore–Hanby index is 
calculated with the formula: 
                                                          
36 Lijphart 1994, pp. 58-62. 
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D , where vi is a party’s vote share and si its share of seats. 37 
Example: If the Loosemore–Hanby index gives the value D=10, then ten percent of all seats are won 
by parties whose share of seats then exceeds their share of votes. Thus it can be interpreted as telling 
us that ten percent of all seats went to the ‘wrong’ parties. 
Michael Gallagher took the Loosemore–Hanby index and adapted it to give a greater weight to 
large deviations and less weight to minor deviations. It does so by squaring the difference between 
each party’s seat share and vote share, whereby any discrepancy becomes multiplied by its own 
value and thus accented above smaller discrepancies. This “least squares” index (LSq) gives a 
numerical value ranging from 0 to 100, with a higher number representing greater deviation from 
perfect proportionality. The number does not, however, have any real-world meaning and is a 
purely comparative figure. The advantage of using the Gallagher index is that it reveals the degree 
of politically meaningful disproportionality better than the other indices as it downplays the 
significance of many small, and often politically insignificant, deviations. The Gallagher index is 
calculated with the formula: 
 
2
2
 

isv
LSq
i
, where vi is a party’s vote share and si its share of seats. 38 
Example: Suppose there are four parties contesting an election and each of them gets 25 percent of 
the total vote. However due to the electoral system used one of the parties, Party A, gets 55 percent of 
the seats, while Party B gets 25 percent and the two others only 10 percent each. 
Now suppose that using a different electoral system the seat shares the parties would have instead 
been 42 %, 38 %, 15 % and 5 %, respectively. Using the Rae index we would in both cases measure 
I=15. This would imply that on average each party’s share of the seats was 15 percentage points 
higher or lower than its share of the votes. This is not far off the mark for any party in the second 
scenario, where the discrepancy actually ranges from 10 to 20 percentage points for each party. It is 
hardly indicative of a single party winning a majority of seats with a quarter of the votes in the first 
scenario, however. 
Similarly, the Loosemore–Hanby index would give both results the value of D=30, which would 
accurately depict that in both scenarios 30 % of all seats were allocated to parties that gained more 
seats than their proportional share. The value is the same for both outcomes even though the second 
scenario is far more evenly proportionate for three out of four parties. 
The Gallagher index on the other hand would highlight the difference between these two results by 
magnifying the large discrepancies over smaller ones. Using Gallagher’s formula we get LSq=23.45 
for the first scenario and LSq=21.89 for the second scenario. Both election outcomes are of course so 
wildly disproportionate that the numerical difference here seems small, even inconsequential. Still, the 
                                                          
37 Lijphart 1994, pp. 58-62. 
38 Lijphart 1994, pp. 58-62. 
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least squares index manages to create a measurable difference where the two other indices portray 
the outcomes as identical. 
I will use all three indices outlined above to compare the proportionality of the electoral systems 
presented in this paper. Each of them gives a different way to interpret the level of 
(dis)proportionality that the systems create. As there is no ‘industry standard’ measurement for 
proportionality, calculating the values for all three indices also makes it easier to make 
comparisons to other electoral systems, whose proportionality may have been measured by other 
researchers with one index but not the others. 
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4. The d’Hondt method 
The d’Hondt and Sainte-Laguë methods of proportional representation, as currently used in 
Finland and a number of other countries, stipulate that the number of votes a party receives – or 
alternatively its vote share as a percentage – is divided by a series of numbers, called divisors. The 
d’Hondt formula uses a string of 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on as its divisors, while the Sainte-Laguë 
formula uses 1, 3, 5, 7, and so on as its divisors.39 The numbers resulting from the division, called 
distribution figures, are then compared to those of other parties. Seats are allocated to parties in 
the order of the distribution figures from the highest to the lowest. 
Example: Suppose that Party A has received 100 votes and Party B 60 votes. The d’Hondt 
distribution figures for Party A would be 100, 50, 33.3, 25, and so on. Party B’s distribution figures 
would be 60, 30, 20, 15, and so on. Suppose there are four seats in the district (i.e. district magnitude 
is 4). The seats would be allocated to the four highest distribution figures (100, 60, 50 and 33.3), 
meaning that Party A would get three seats and Party B one seat. 
As this is done separately in each district so that the seat distribution is always bound within the 
confines of a single district, I will refer to this traditional, simple application of d’Hondt as the 
district-bound d’Hondt system in order to differentiate it from the different variations of the same 
formula that I will introduce later. 
The above is the mathematical representation of the d’Hondt method. However, since the d’Hondt 
method uses a string of 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on as its divisors, it is possible to interpret the formula in 
a different, more intuitive way. Think of dividing a party’s total vote count not with an artificial string 
of numbers, but with the ranks that individual candidates hold on the party list: The candidate who 
is ranked first on the list, i.e. who in an open-list system received the most personal votes of all the 
party’s candidates in the district, will get the party’s total vote count as her distribution figure (total 
votes divided by 1). The candidate with the second-most votes will get half of the party’s vote count 
as his distribution figure (divided by 2) and the candidate with the tenth-most votes will get a tenth 
of the party’s vote count as hers (divided by 10). Now each candidate has a personal distribution 
figure assigned to him. Those individual distribution figures are then compared to those of all other 
candidates, and the candidates with the highest distribution figures get elected. This interpretation 
allows us to intuitively use the d’Hondt method in a new way that takes into account not only votes 
cast in a single district, but all votes from all districts, as we calculate the distribution figures for 
each candidate. 
                                                          
39 Sainte-Laguë is usually used in a modified form where the first divisor is 1.4 instead of 1 but where all the 
other divisors remain the same. This change makes it harder for parties to gain their first (or only) seat, and 
is a case of electoral engineering that aims to limit the number of parties in parliament. 
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5. Introducing the Roinila–d’Hondt method 
As outlined above, in the usual application of d’Hondt (or Sainte-Laguë) a candidate in an electoral 
district gets a distribution figure that is used to measure whether that candidate is elected or not by 
comparing his or her distribution figure to that of other candidates. This distribution figure is 
counted by dividing the total number of votes the candidate’s party list received in the candidate’s 
district by the divisor, which in the d’Hondt system is effectively the position the candidate holds on 
the party list. In the Finnish case the candidate’s rank on the party list depends on the number of 
individual votes he or she received. This is known as the open-list system, where voters get to 
determine the order in which candidates are elected from each party. In a closed-list system, by 
contrast, the order of candidates on a party list is pre-determined by the party nominating the 
candidates, and the voters have no say in the order in which candidates get elected. 
The method I have proposed changes this formula by counting the distribution figures not from the 
votes a party received in a given candidate’s own district, but from the votes the party received in 
all districts combined. That aggregate vote count is then divided by each candidate’s rank on a 
combined list that includes all candidates of the same party from every district. The distribution 
figure arrived at in this way is then used to measure each candidate against all other candidates in 
their respective districts, just as in the original d’Hondt (or Sainte-Laguë) method. 
As we shall see later, counting the distribution figures of a party from all its votes, rather than from 
just the votes it received in a single district, improves national-level proportionality between parties 
compared to the original d’Hondt method without adding undue complexity, all the while keeping 
electoral districts intact as vehicles of regional representation. Candidates would continue to be 
elected in principle as they have been before, from individual districts, but in a manner that takes 
into account the nation-wide popularity of their parties. 
5.1. Theory into practice 
This is the basic premise from which I started developing the method, first outlined in an essay I 
wrote to the University of Tampere in 2007, with the objective of achieving better proportionality 
between parties at the national level in a way that would require as few changes as possible to the 
existing electoral system then in use. Further study revealed that this basic concept can be 
executed in practice in one of two ways. Both are similar in that the d’Hondt formula is applied to 
the total number of votes each party list receives from all districts combined, generating a single list 
of distribution figures for each party. Those distribution figures are then assigned to individual 
candidates of each party with the highest-ranked candidates getting the largest distribution figures 
of their respective parties. This basic concept of counting distribution figures for district level 
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candidates from the votes cast in multiple districts is, to my knowledge, novel. For the lack of a 
better term, I will call it the Roinila–d’Hondt method. (Note that the same concept can also be 
applied just as well to the Sainte-Laguë or any other “highest averages” formula in place of the 
d’Hondt formula.) 
Once the distribution figures have been assigned to party lists and their individual candidates, 
whether by the d’Hondt, Sainte-Laguë or some other formula, there are two slightly different ways 
of determining the order in which candidates get elected from the districts.  
The first option is to proceed as we would in a traditional district-bound d’Hondt system, whereby 
each candidate’s distribution figure is compared to that of all other candidates in the same district, 
only in this case – using the Roinila–d’Hondt method in place of the traditional d’Hondt method – 
the distribution figure has been derived from the national rather than the district vote. I will refer to 
this variant of the Roinila–d’Hondt method as the district-by-district method. 
The second option is to compare the distribution figures right at the national level (or regional, 
federal, or any other supra-district level) to directly distribute seats, one by one, to the party lists 
and their individual candidates in the order of the distribution figures from the largest to the 
smallest. I will call this variant of the Roinila–d’Hondt method the direct distribution method. 
These variations in the procedures used to distribute the seats lead to a slightly different, albeit 
broadly similar, election outcome. As we will see later, one of these methods will produce an 
overall outcome (and proportionality) identical to that of the Ministry of Justice proposal, while the 
other produces an even better national-level proportionality at the cost of some added complexity. 
First, however, I will go through both systems in detail. 
5.2. District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt 
This variant arose from the idea that the most straight-forward way to apply the distribution figures 
is to do it in a similar fashion as the traditional, district-bound d’Hondt method does, whereby each 
candidate is assigned a distribution figure by the d’Hondt formula that is then compared to that of 
all other candidates in the same district. The candidates who ‘score’ the highest distribution figures 
from their district will be elected until all the representative slots from that district have been filled. 
The only difference to the traditional d’Hondt method is that the distribution figure of each 
candidate is counted on the national level rather than on the district level, meaning that the 
distribution figure is derived from the votes the candidate’s party received from all districts 
combined rather than just from the votes the party received in the candidate’s district alone. 
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To count the distribution figures for a given party’s candidates we first need to rank the candidates 
on the party’s candidate list from the first to the last. The order of candidates on a party list can be 
pre-determined by the party itself – called a “closed list”, as used in Sweden – or determined by the 
number of personal votes each candidate on the list received – an “open list”, as used in Finland. 
We then assign the smallest d’Hondt divisor to the candidate with the highest number of personal 
votes (or whoever is ranked first on the party list if a closed-list system is used), the second divisor 
to the candidate with the second-most personal votes, and so on. As the d’Hondt divisors are 1, 2, 
3, et cetera, we can quickly see that the divisor assigned to each candidate in this way is in effect 
the same as the candidate’s rank on the party list. Thus we can do away with d’Hondt’s 
mathematical formula altogether and say that each candidate’s distribution figure is the total votes 
received by his or her party divided by the candidate’s rank on the party list. 
After this procedure we compare each candidate’s distribution figure against those of other 
candidates from the same district in order to determine which of the candidates get elected. To do 
this, we look at the distribution figures of all candidates in a district and simply fill the representative 
slots of the district going from the highest distribution figure to the lowest until all the representative 
slots of the district have been filled. As I discovered in my previous study of the system, however, 
this method can in some instances lead to a rather undesirable paradox in which a party can lose 
seats in some districts by winning more votes elsewhere. Working around the paradox requires 
one additional step to the proceedings described here before we can declare the outcome final, but 
we will return to that later. For now the knowledge of that paradox gives us a reason to study an 
alternative method. 
5.3. Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt 
Rather than making a district-by-district comparison between candidates, the distribution figures 
produced by the d’Hondt formula from each party’s total vote counts can be compared right at the 
national level and the seats awarded directly to the highest distribution figures there. If there are 
200 seats available, as in Finland, then the 200 highest distribution figures win the seats. Not only 
is this method more straight-forward than doing a district-by-district comparison of distribution 
figures, but it also allows us to determine the total number of seats each party wins before we have 
assigned a single representative slot to an individual candidate. 
In this model, assigning the seats won by each party to individual candidates happens one by one, 
with the party that had the highest distribution figure of all parties – i.e. the party that received the 
most votes – going first: The party with the highest distribution figure assigns the first seat to the 
highest-ranked candidate on its party list, after which the second seat is assigned by whichever 
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party has the second highest distribution figure, the third seat by the party owning the third highest 
distribution figure, and so on until all the seats that were up for grabs have found an owner in an 
individual candidate. 
Note that this process does not require us to know the total number of seats a party has won 
beforehand, and that we can complete the process of assigning the seats to candidates before we 
have calculated how many seats each party has won.  In practice, then, there is only one phase of 
seat distribution even though it is also possible to conduct the party seat distribution and candidate 
assignment as separate and distinct phases.  
Example: Suppose that Party A receives 200 votes, Party B receives 60 votes, Party C receives 
40 votes, and that there are 10 seats up for grabs. The parties get the following distribution figures 
according to the d’Hondt formula: 
 Party A:  200, 100, 66.7, 50, 40, 33.3, 28.6 … 
 Party B:  60, 30, 20, 15, 12, 10, 8.6 … 
 Party C:  40, 20, 13.3, 10, 8, 6.7, 5.7 … 
The ten seats are awarded to the ten highest distribution figures. We can immediately determine that 
Party A will win a total of six seats, Party B three and Party C just one.40 We will, however, eventually 
arrive at the same outcome even if we simply start assigning the available ten seats directly to the 
candidates with the ten highest distribution figures: 
Party A with the highest distribution figure of 200 assigns the first seat to its highest-ranked candidate. 
The second and third seats also go to Party A’s candidates with its distribution figures of 100 and 66.7 
before Party B gets to assign its first seat with the distribution figure of 60. The fourth seat goes again 
to Party A with the distribution figure of 50, the fifth to Party C with 40, and so forth.  Once all ten seats 
have been assigned to individual candidates, we will see that Party A won six seats, Party B three and 
Party C only one, just as we determined above. The first phase is thus superfluous and entirely 
optional. 
At some point in the process the candidate next in line for a seat will probably come from a district 
where all the district’s representative slots have already been filled. Assuming the district 
magnitudes are fixed and that candidates can only be elected from a district in which they were 
registered – as is the case in Finland – that candidate cannot then be elected despite being next in 
line on their party list to be assigned a seat. The party still needs to assign its remaining seat or 
seats to someone, however. The simple and perhaps obvious solution is to have the next-highest-
ranking candidate on the party list to fill that spot instead – provided that she or he is from a district 
                                                          
40 Party B and C both have an equal distribution figure competing for one remaining seat. Although such a 
situation would be extremely rare in a real-world scenario, such a situation can be easily resolved with a 
simple tie-breaker rule – for example by awarding the contested seat to the party that received the most 
votes. In this case the contested seat goes to Party B. 
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that still hasn’t filled its quota of representatives. This is repeated until all the seats a party has won 
have been assigned to candidates from eligible districts. It is important to note that while this 
process may skip one or several candidates on a party’s list, it does not skip their distribution 
figures; their distribution figures are in effect transferred to the candidate next in line to be elected 
from the party’s list. 41 
Another rare but nevertheless realistic a scenario that we have to account for is one where two 
candidates from the same party receive precisely the same number of votes. In the 2007 elections 
in Finland this happened once. As both candidates cannot be given the same distribution figure, 
we must find a way to determine which of them should be listed first on their party’s list and 
therefore be assigned a larger distribution figure.42 If the candidates are from different districts we 
can check whether the higher distribution figure of the two contested ones is able to win a seat in 
either of their districts. If it is large enough to win a seat in just one of the districts but not in both, it 
is then assigned to whichever candidate is registered in that district. If it is sufficient to win a seat in 
both districts, we proceed to compare the next-highest distribution figure and see whether that is 
also large enough to win a seat in both districts. If yes, the relative rank of the two candidates does 
not matter, as both get elected anyway. If one candidate would get elected with the higher 
distribution figure but not the lower, and the other candidate would get elected with either 
distribution figure, then the higher distribution figure is assigned to the candidate that would not get 
elected with the lower one. Finally, if both candidates happen to come from the same district their 
position on the party list relative to each other can simply be determined by lottery, as it would not 
affect the overall election result or seat distribution between parties. 
Although lengthier to explain, this method is in practice more straight-forward to execute than the 
district-by-district comparison described above. As we will see later, both methods produce broadly 
similar but nevertheless slightly different outcomes. There would also be other ways for achieving 
precisely the same outcome, but assigning the seats one-by-one is by far the simplest way to avoid 
situations where more candidates are elected from a district than its pre-determined district 
magnitude allows. 
                                                          
41 Another way to perceive the process would be that all seats are first distributed to parties according to the 
highest distribution figures and then assigned into the districts where the distribution figures originated from. 
If a distribution figure points to a district with no empty seats left, the seat it assigned to the next available 
district where the party holds its next-highest distribution figure. Once we know how many seats each party 
has in each district it is only a matter of filling those seats with the candidates who received the most votes of 
each party in each district. This is only an alternative way of describing the process and does not change the 
outcome of the seat distribution at any level. 
42 Note that this applies only to open-list systems where the candidates’ order on the party list is not 
predetermined. 
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5.4. The Paradox: Winning more seats with less votes – and how to fix it 
As I calculated simulated election results for the district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method in my 
Bachelor’s Thesis, I observed a weird anomaly in the outcomes. One medium-sized party was left 
with a relatively significant43 underrepresentation even as it was being eliminated from all other 
parties. Closer inspection revealed that the party had been very unlucky in how the votes it 
received were divided among the districts; the party had lost several seats across multiple districts 
with very small margins while those losing candidates competed for the same distribution figures 
on the party’s list with margins of only some dozens of votes. The party had effectively lost two 
seats in parliament (that is, one percent of all seats) by a difference that was only 0.16 % of the 
total votes cast. The paradox this revealed was much more alarming than the fact that a party 
could so narrowly lose two seats, however. 
Looking at the election results in each of the narrowly contested districts, I realized that the party in 
question would have gained two extra seats in parliament had two of the party’s candidates, and 
thus the party as a whole, received less votes. This was made possible by the fact that a candidate 
who, in an open-list system, receives fewer votes will drop down on the party-list ranking and thus 
ends up ‘giving’ another candidate a higher distribution figure. That distribution figure, though too 
small for winning a seat in one particular district, may be just large enough for winning a seat in 
another narrowly contested district. This meant that a party winning ‘too many’ votes in the ‘wrong’ 
district ended up actually hurting the party in other districts. This is of course a very undesirable 
feature in an electoral system that strives towards a proportional election outcome. 
Fortunately it turned out that this paradox is simple enough to fix without having to change the 
basic concept of the system. The seat distribution can be corrected after the preliminary results 
have been calculated and after parties suffering from underrepresentation (if any) have been 
identified. This is done by taking all of the parties that suffer underrepresentation, picking their 
highest distribution figure that did not get a candidate elected, and transferring that distribution 
figure to the candidate next in line on that party’s list. If the distribution figure is not enough to win a 
seat in that candidate’s district either, it is moved on to the next candidate, and so on, until it wins a 
seat in one of the districts where the party still had unelected candidates. The party that had in the 
preliminary results won a seat with a smaller distribution figure in that district will lose its seat. This 
process is repeated until none of the parties that won seats in the preliminary results are left 
underrepresented. 
                                                          
43 A one-percentage-point deviation between the party’s vote and seat shares, which under the regular 
d’Hondt system is commonplace for all but the largest parties. 
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Applied to the 2007 election results this fix resulted in the reallocation of eight seats out of a total of 
199 seats in parliament44 and resulted in the complete elimination of underrepresentation of the 
parties that passed the threshold of exclusion to win seats in parliament.45 Any overrepresentation 
left in the seat shares of parties is therefore the result of some parties failing to pass the threshold 
of exclusion to win representation in parliament. This is a key characteristic of the electoral system: 
All parties elected to parliament receive at least as many seats as their share of all votes cast 
would indicate. 
At this point it is worth pointing out that while this correction of underrepresentation is only 
mandatory in the district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method as a fix to the “less is more paradox”, it 
can also be applied to its direct-distribution variant as well. In the latter’s case the correction would 
result in the reallocation of only two seats, but would interestingly produce an identical overall seat 
distribution as the district-by-district method. The only difference between the systems would then 
be in who gets elected, as the systems assign distribution figures to individual candidates in a 
slightly different way. Thus it seems that the only difference in overall seat distribution between the 
systems, if any, arises from any uncorrected underrepresentation left in the direct distribution 
method. Applying the correction to the results produced by the direct distribution method is 
optional, however, as it does not require it to avoid any identified paradox. 
Therefore I am inclined to judge the direct distribution method to be the superior system of the two 
proposed here, as it is both simpler and more versatile in that it doesn’t have to deploy a 
mandatory correction of underrepresentation to its seat distribution. However, including the slightly 
different results of both systems in the simulation presented in Chapter 7.3 yields an interesting 
comparison as it reveals the impact that the post-hoc correction of underrepresentation would have 
on the overall seat distribution and candidate selection. 
                                                          
44 Excluding the seat reserved for the single-member constituency of Åland. 
45 In some cases it may not be possible to eliminate underrepresentation entirely. However, with a 200 seat 
parliament the remaining underrepresentation will, in any situation, very likely be in the 0–0.4 % range 
depending on the voting result, which amounts to less than one seat. 
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6. Other electoral region models: The origins and the benefits of the concept 
After the 2007 parliamentary elections there was a brief public debate about electoral reform that 
saw the publication of novel proposals about forming “electoral regions” that would encompass 
multiple districts. The idea was to substitute the party lists of each district at the regional level for 
party lists that would combine candidates from multiple districts, while maintaining the district-
based nomination and election of candidates. The electoral systems I introduced in Chapter 5 are 
essentially adaptations of the electoral region concept, the main difference being that they utilize a 
single nation-wide electoral region instead of multiple ‘regional electoral regions’. 
Neither the systems I have proposed nor the electoral region system proposed by the Ministry of 
Justice in 2008, presented in Chapter 7, were the first to use the concept of a single, nation-wide, 
supra-district electoral region, however. Kimmo Kuusela was the first to propose the concept of an 
electoral region in 1994 for the Finnish elections to the European Parliament, although his system 
didn’t include fixed district magnitudes.46 Then, in 2003, Achilles Westling proposed what he 
termed the “spiral system”, which was a novel application of the d’Hondt method where seats 
distributed at the national level using the d’Hondt formula were “spiralled” down into districts to 
individual candidates.47 
Westling’s spiral model, much like the model proposed by the Ministry of Justice working group a 
few years later, however required the allocation of seats to be done in two distinct phases using 
two different methods: first distributing the seats to party lists at the national level using the d’Hondt 
method (or equivalent) and then allocating the seats to individual districts and candidates with the 
spiral method (which the Ministry of Justice working group supplanted with the Hare–Niemayer 
method). By contrast, the electoral region model I have outlined above, in both its versions, uses 
only the d’Hondt method and its resultant distribution figures to allocate seats to parties and 
candidates by simple numerical comparisons of said distribution figures. 
The concept of district-combining electoral regions has remained largely unknown outside of 
Finland, at least judging by English political science literature. As far as I’m aware, none of the 
electoral region models described here have been presented in English-language publications. 
Moreover, the Roinila–d’Hondt method I’ve presented here, in both its variations, appears entirely 
                                                          
46 In Kuusela’s proposal district magnitudes depended on the number of votes cast in each district for each 
seat-winning party, and so was closer to the model trialed in Kainuu provincial elections in 2004 (see 
Chapter 7.2) than either Westling’s model or any of the three models studied in this paper. Ylisalo, Maunula 
& Helin 2012, pp. 258–259. 
47 Westling 2003. 
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unheard of. Previous electoral system literature does not, to the best of my understanding, know of 
a similar system where d’Hondt (or equivalent) distribution figures would be calculated from 
national-level votes but where they would determine the election of individual candidates at the 
district level without the use of a separate mathematical formula.48 
The significance of the electoral region concept is perhaps more easily understood when we 
consider that when the traditional d’Hondt method is used in a multi-district election, such as in 
Finland with its 14 districts plus the single-member constituency of Åland, the election effectively 
isn’t a single national election but rather several concurrent sub-national elections – in Finland’s 
case 15 different elections – that in no way influence the results of one another. Using the Roinila–
d’Hondt method or any other nation-wide electoral region model these separate elections are 
combined into one national election, whereby the votes cast in each and every district influence the 
election as a whole. The practical benefit for the individual voters is that they get to influence the 
national results even if their preferred party fails to win a single seat in their own district. This is 
especially significant for voters in small districts where it is harder for small parties to get their 
candidates elected, and where voters are therefore discouraged from voting any party that is not 
very likely to make the cut in that particular district – even if the same party is likely to get several 
candidates elected in other districts. Therefore, in addition to enabling greater overall 
proportionality, the use of the electoral region concept will increase voter choice over both 
individual candidates and parties. 
                                                          
48 See for instance Taagepera & Shugart 1989; ECPDR 2000; Farrell 2001; Gallagher & Mitchell 2006; 
Maunula 2008. 
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7. The Ministry of Justice proposal 
In June 2007 the Ministry of Justice appointed a working group to prepare proposals for the 
electoral reform that the second government of the then-Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen had taken 
on its agenda. The government plan-of-action prescribed a reform that would preserve the existing 
districting while achieving as high a degree of proportionality as possible. The starting point for the 
working group was the previously discussed electoral region concept, based on which the working 
group prepared ten alternative designs for a practical electoral system. Having narrowed down the 
alternatives the working group submitted its final report with a single final proposal on April 24th of 
the following year.49 
7.1.  Description of the system 
The working group’s final proposal shares the same basic premise with the Roinila–d’Hondt 
outlined in Chapter 5; in it, all electoral districts – barring the single-member constituency of Åland 
– are combined into a single, nation-wide electoral region where the votes from every district are 
combined into a single national tally of votes for each party. The d’Hondt formula is then used to 
count a set of distribution figures for each party, again just as in the Roinila–d’Hondt method. 
Those distribution figures are then used to determine the number of seats each party wins in 
parliament by assigning the seats to parties one-by-one, with the party with the highest distribution 
figure winning the first seat, the party with the second-highest distribution figure winning the 
second seat, and so on until all 199 seats have been assigned to a party. (Note that as discussed 
in Chapter 5.3, this is also a possible but not a mandatory step in the direct-distribution Roinila–
d’Hondt method.) 
That is where the similarities between the two concepts end, however. The working group’s 
proposal goes on to assign the seats won by each party to its candidates not according the 
distribution figures that were already counted, but by using an entirely different mathematical 
formula that is wholly independent from the distribution figures and the highest averages method 
used to count them. The d’Hondt method and its distribution figures are used only for counting the 
number of seats each party wins in parliament.50 
                                                          
49 OMKM 2008:2, pp. 3, 17–23; Email exchange between the author and a member of the working group, 
Prof. Heikki Paloheimo, in 2008 and 2012. 
50 OMKM 2008:2, pp. 16, 24, 33. 
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This is also where the working group’s proposal starts to get rather complicated51. In order to 
assign the seats that each party won in parliament to individual candidates in the districts, the 
Ministry of Justice proposal deploys the so-called Hare–Niemayer method. The Hare–Niemayer is 
a “largest remainder” method that determines the exact number of seats that a party should 
receive in a district with decimal accuracy. If and when this quota of seats cannot be met in full, 
such as when a party would be entitled to four-and-a-half seats in a given district, the party is first 
assigned as many full seats in the district as its quota indicates – in our example four seats. Given 
that one seat naturally cannot be divided into fractions of a seat between different parties, our 
example party is left with a quota of one half of one seat. This remainder is then compared to the 
remainders of other parties and the parties with the largest remainders will be assigned any 
remaining seats in the district one-by-one in the order of the remainders from the largest to the 
smallest. Hence the “largest remainder” method. 
Of course, since the election result was determined at the supra-district level in the electoral region 
and not in a single district, both the calculation of the seat quotas and the comparison of largest 
remainders have to also happen at the same supra-district level. This is what makes the Ministry of 
Justice proposal a novel electoral system concept in its own right, as the largest remainders 
methods – just as the highest averages methods of d’Hondt et al. – have traditionally been only 
ever applied in the confines of individual districts where the formulas used don’t have to take into 
account anything that happens outside the district boundaries. 
So far the basic concept remains rather simple, even if not quite as straight-forward as using just 
the d’Hondt formula. Counting and comparing the quotas is more difficult, however. The Hare–
Niemayer formula would ordinarily determine a party’s seat quota (Q) in an individual district by 
simply dividing the party’s votes in the district (P) with the total number of votes cast in the district 
(V) and then multiplying the resulting quotient with the number of available seats in the district, i.e. 
the district magnitude (M): 
V
MP
Q
 × 
  =   
The electoral region variant of Hare–Niemayer uses the same formula but divides the party’s 
number of votes in a given district (P) not by all the votes cast in the district, but by the votes the 
party received in all districts of the electoral region combined (PSUM). Then, rather than multiplying 
                                                          
51 So criticized by its own members in the working group’s final report. OMKM 2008:2, pp. 43, 140, 142, 146. 
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the result with the district magnitude, the resulting quotient is instead used as a multiplier for the 
number of seats the party was assigned in parliament (S) by the d’Hondt formula:52 
SUMP
SP
Q
  
    

  
Therefore, the formula effectively determines not the share of seats that a party should win in a 
particular district, as the Hare–Niemayer traditionally does, but rather the share of the party’s seats 
to be assigned to a particular district. This calculation is naturally repeated for every district in 
which the party has registered candidates. It is worth noting that this version of the Hare–Niemayer 
formula, unlike the original, takes no account of how many seats there are actually available in the 
given district that the quota is calculated for, and the resulting quota of seats to be assigned to a 
given district may therefore, at least in theory, exceed even the district magnitude. 
Once every party has a quota for every district in which it had registered candidates, we can 
proceed with actually assigning the seats to the parties and candidates. The quotas are, of course, 
for the most part decimal numbers, so we must first separate the integer part of each quota from its 
fractional remainder part. All parties are first assigned seats according to the integers; in our 
example case, the party with a quota of 4.5 seats in a given district is assigned four seats, as the 
integer of its quota is 4. The left-over fractions of this process, such as the .5 of our example party, 
are remainders which will be used later to assign seats that remain vacant after all of the integers 
have been used up. 
Once every party has been assigned as many seats as its quota integers indicate, there very likely 
remain a number of seats yet unassigned to any party.53 In a multi-district electoral region these 
vacant left-over seats are in all likelihood spread across multiple districts. To determine which party 
is to get which of these seats, both the remaining unassigned seats and the quota remainders of all 
parties are pooled into a ranked list. The remainders are ranked from the largest to the smallest, 
with each remainder listed next to the district that the remainder derived was from. The remaining 
unassigned seats are then assigned to parties one-by-one, starting with the district with the largest 
remainder and going from there until all of the seats in every district have been assigned to a party. 
The largest remainder on the list points to a district. If that district has any unassigned seats left, 
one of them is then assigned to the party that owned the largest remainder – unless that party has 
                                                          
52 OMKM 2008:2, p. 33. 
53 With Finland’s 2007 voting result 47 out of 199 seats remained unassigned after the integer-allocation. 
OMKM 2008:2, pp. 117–118. 
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already been assigned as many seats as it is entitled to.  If the party with the largest remainder is 
not eligible for the seat, the seat is given to whichever party owns the second-largest remainder in 
the same district. If, on the other hand, the district has no more seats available, the party that 
owned the district’s largest remainder will instead get a seat from the district where its next-largest 
unused remainder points to. As a result of this shuffling it may happen that a party wins more seats 
from a single district than it has registered candidates in the district. Should that occur, the party 
will get its seat from the already-full district where its largest unused remainder pointed to, while 
the party that last had a seat assigned in that district will have its seat transferred to another 
district. 54 
Once all available seats have been allocated to parties, the only thing left to do is to assign those 
seats to individual candidates. The working group proposed that the seats allocated to a party in a 
given district are awarded to candidates who received the most personal votes in that district.55 
This makes it an open-list system just like the existing electoral system as well as the two models I 
have proposed, and thus gives us another interesting point of comparison later on when we turn 
our attention to the selection of individual candidates. At the national level the model produces an 
identical result to that of the direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method, only differing from it in 
which particular candidates get elected and from which districts; the seat distribution between 
parties and thus the overall proportionality is the same in both systems thanks to the similar 
application of the d’Hondt formula at the national level. 
7.2. Criticism towards the system 
The Ministry of Justice working group argued that its proposed Hare–Niemayer method is the 
simplest method it could identify for producing greater political proportionality than the traditional 
d’Hondt system that would still maintain the existing electoral districts as vehicles for 
geographically proportional representation. It argued that the Hare–Niemayer is, while somewhat 
complicated, ultimately “sufficiently simple” so as to not risk alienating voters by making the 
electoral calculations too difficult to understand for the average voter.56 
This, however, resulted in the single most significant discord within the working group: 
Representatives from the Swedish People’s Party and the Social Democratic Party left their 
dissenting opinions in the working group’s final report, arguing that the electoral region model and 
its Hare–Niemayer method is too complicated and would discourage voters who would find it 
                                                          
54 OMKM 2008:2, pp. 27, 33–34, 112–121. 
55 OMKM 2008:2, p. 34. 
56 OMKM 2008:2, p. 44. 
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difficult to understand how their vote is translated into a particular candidate being elected. This 
criticism was warranted by the working group’s own remarks, where it both repeatedly argued 
against a number of electoral systems due to their “convoluted” or “clarity-obscuring” nature and 
listed simplicity as a key objective identified by a previous working group that studied the possibility 
of electoral reform in Finland.57 
A very similar system to that proposed by the Ministry of Justice working group has already been 
trialed in the Kainuu provincial elections in Finland. As in the model proposed by the working 
group, the Kainuu model also combined a multi-district electoral region with a two-phased seat 
distribution method, done in the first phase with the d’Hondt formula and in the second phase with 
the Hare–Niemayer method. In Kainuu’s case the provincial electoral region consisted of multiple 
municipalities, each of which acted as individual districts. However, unlike in the model’s national 
application proposed by the working group, in the Kainuu elections voters could cast their vote for 
any candidate in any one of the electoral region’s districts regardless of where they themselves 
were registered in as voters. In addition, the district magnitude was not pre-set, but the number of 
representatives elected from each district was instead determined after-the-fact by the number of 
voters who went in to cast their ballots in each district.58 
The Ministry of Justice had set another working group, dubbed the “Democracy 2007 committee”, 
to study this real-life experiment and the lessons it gave that might be deemed applicable for 
national elections. In its final report the working group made the following remarks: 
“The 2004 Kainuu provincial elections showed that the electoral system is, in its 
details, very complicated and difficult in its application, and may lead to situations 
where the will of the voters is poorly realized.”59 
”The committee considers it important that the electoral system used in Finland’s 
parliamentary elections […] is from the voters perspective simple, so that the voter 
understands the impact of his or her vote”60 
                                                          
57 OMKM 2008:2, p. 35. 
58 OMKM 2005:1, pp. 30–31. 
59 OMKM 2005:1, pp. 30–31. Original quotation in Finnish: ”Vuoden 2004 Kainuun maakuntavaalit osoittivat, 
että vaalijärjestelmä on yksityiskohdiltaan varsin monimutkainen ja hankalasti sovellettava ja saattaa johtaa 
tilanteisiin, joissa äänestäjien tahto toteutuu huonosti.” Translation mine. 
60 OMKM 2008:2, p. 34. Original quotation in Finnish: ”Toimikunta pitää tärkeänä sitä, että Suomen 
eduskuntavaalijärjestelmä … on äänestäjän näkökulmasta selkeä, jotta äänestäjä ymmärtää, miten hänen 
antamansa ääni vaikuttaa”. Translation mine. 
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The working group considered the simplicity or complexity of the electoral system as a factor that 
would affect voter turnout and highlighted its importance for the legitimacy of the elections. 
According to their conclusions the complexity of the electoral system may interfere with the voters’ 
ability to perceive which candidate and which party will ultimately benefit from their vote.61 After the 
2004 election experiment both the electoral region model and the Hare–Niemayer method were 
abandoned in Kainuu provincial elections, with the following 2008 election organized again with the 
traditional, district-bound d’Hondt method.62 
Although the Kainuu model is not entirely identical with the model proposed for national elections 
by the Ministry of Justice working group, the criticism towards the Kainuu model is equally valid 
towards the newer proposal. After all, the key component that was seen as a cause of excess 
complexity – the two-phased seat distribution with both the d’Hondt and the Hare–Niemayer 
methods – is at the core of the electoral system proposed by the Ministry of Justice working group. 
Just as the complexity of the system doomed the Kainuu reforms, it ultimately proved to be the 
downfall of the entire national electoral reform project as well: The complexity of the proposed 
system became one of the biggest arguments against its adoption in parliament.63 While the new 
system was originally supposed to be in place in the parliamentary elections of 2015, the 
constitutional changes needed for its adoption now make it dubious if it, or any other system, can 
be adopted in time even for the following 2019 elections. Meanwhile all of the problems identified in 
the traditional d’Hondt method – and agreed upon as such by all parties in parliament since at least 
the 1990s – remain unresolved. 
Fortunately, as we shall see in the simulated results presented in Chapter 8, the complex methods 
proposed by the working group are not necessary for producing the exact same political result and 
national-level proportionality. 
7.3. A note on electoral thresholds 
The Ministry of Justice electoral reform proposal included the introduction of both national and 
district level legal thresholds of exclusion. According to the proposed limits, to gain representation 
a party would have to receive either over 3.5 % of all votes cast or over 12 % of the votes cast in a 
single district. Furthermore, a party that does not receive more than 3.5 % of the national vote will 
only get its candidates elected in districts where it received more than 12 % of the vote.64 The then-
                                                          
61 OMKM 2008:2, pp. 26–27. 
62 Ministry of Justice 2008b. 
63 Aamulehti 2009. 
64 OMKM 2008:2, p. 42. 
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Minister of Justice, Tuija Brax, argued that the legal thresholds would ”prevent the fragmentation of 
the parliament”.65 The working group’s final report also stated that the legal thresholds “may 
indirectly promote better proportionality” as voters would refrain from voting marginal parties whose 
popularity wasn’t sufficient for passing the threshold.66 It should be noted that the proposed 
thresholds were significantly lower than the hidden thresholds of most of the smaller districts in the 
existing electoral system using the district-bound d’Hondt method.67 
To make comparing the electoral systems easier, I have applied the proposed legal thresholds to 
the simulated results of all three proposed electoral systems.68 
  
                                                          
65 Ministry of Justice 2008a. Translation mine. 
66 OMKM 2008:2, p. 15. Translation mine. 
67 OMKM 2005:1, p. 28. 
68 It should be noted that, at least in the case of Finland, the inclusion of legal thresholds that exclude parties 
that would only gain a few seats from parliament may make it more likely that the electoral region concept is 
adopted at all. As Taagepera has argued, electoral reform faces least resistance “when the existing number 
and size of parties are not altered” (Taagepera 2007, p. 177). In Finland’s case the 3.5 % threshold would 
have prevented two new parties from entering the parliament should the electoral region been in use in the 
2007 elections (see Chapter 8). 
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8. Results 
We shall now look at the real and simulated election outcomes produced by the different electoral 
systems, first at the national level and then, in the next chapter, at the district level. We will start by 
comparing the overall seat distribution of each system, both in absolute numbers and proportional 
shares. After that we will analyse the results with the mathematical indices of disproportionality 
presented in Chapter 3. 
8.1. Election outcomes 
Table 1 lists the total number of seats won by each party under each of the electoral systems 
under our review. The calculations include the 3.5 % legal threshold of exclusion proposed by the 
Ministry of Justice working group. 
Table 1. The real and simulated election results of the different electoral systems based on the 
voting results of Finland’s 2007 parliamentary elections. Change in seat distribution as compared to 
the traditional d’Hondt method is shown in parentheses in grey while seats lost due to the legal 
threshold of exclusion are shown in red. 
 
Parties are denoted with their Finnish abbreviations, the explanations of which are presented in 
Appendix D. 
 
Party d’Hondt 
District-by-district 
Roinila–d’Hondt 
Direct-distribution 
Roinila–d’Hondt 
Ministry of Justice 
proposal 
KESK 51  46 (-5) 47 (-4) 47 (-4) 
KOK 50  45 (-5) 46 (-4) 46 (-4) 
SDP 45  44 (-1) 44 (-1) 44 (-1) 
VAS 17  18 (+1) 18 (+1) 18 (+1) 
VIHR 15  17 (+2) 17 (+2) 17 (+2) 
KD 7  10 (+3) 10 (+3) 10 (+3) 
RKP 9  10 (+1) 9  9  
PS 5  9 (+4) 8 (+3) 8 (+3) 
        
SKP 0  0 (-1) 0 (-1) 0 (-1) 
SSP 0  0 (-1) 0 (-1) 0 (-1) 
 
Looking at the national level results, we can see that the proposed electoral region models differ 
significantly from the actual 2007 election outcome that was determined with the traditional d’Hondt 
method with its independent districts. In all electoral region models the two largest parties lose the 
most seats relative to the historical 2007 outcome, while the biggest winners are the two smallest 
parties. This is a direct result of the better overall proportionality that they produce compared to the 
traditional district-bound d’Hondt, where larger parties stand at a considerable advantage 
especially in small districts. 
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We can also observe that both the model proposed by the Ministry of Justice working group and 
the direct distribution model I have proposed produce an identical overall outcome, as both use the 
same d’Hondt formula to calculate the national-level results. All three electoral region systems 
award more seats to small and medium-sized parties than the traditional d’Hondt system currently 
in use. Depending on the electoral region model used, the three largest parties lose from nine to 
eleven seats combined, which amounts to a significant shift in legislative power in a 200-member 
parliament; Where the two largest parties could together hold an absolute majority of seats in 
parliament after the 2007 elections – thus theoretically enabling a two-party majority government – 
no two parties could have achieved the same had any of the electoral region systems been used 
instead. The higher number of seats gained by the smaller parties under the electoral region 
models hints at a higher overall proportionality under those systems. 
Interestingly – and significantly – the Swedish People’s Party of Finland (RKP69), which contested 
the election in only four out of 14 districts, doesn’t suffer from its geographically concentrated voter 
base under the electoral region models. This was one of the major worries of the party’s 
representatives in the electoral region working group. What we see from the simulated results is 
actually quite the contrary: Using the district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method would even 
increase the party’s seat count. Using an electoral region thus doesn’t appear to threaten parties 
with geographically focused support, which would be a major concern for parties representing 
vulnerable minority groups, such as ethnic or religious – or, in this case, linguistic – minorities. 
Another noteworthy observation to be made here is that were an artificially imposed threshold not 
used, all three electoral region models would have allowed two new parties to gain representation 
in parliament. The Senior Citizens’ Party (SSP70) and the Communist Party (SKP71) would have 
each won one seat in parliament. Both received enough votes to get over the 0.5 % hidden 
threshold of the electoral region models, but neither would have survived the cut against the 
proposed, legally imposed 3.5 % threshold. Neither did either party reach the proposed 12 % 
threshold in any one district that would have made them eligible for a seat despite falling under the 
3.5 % national threshold.72 Therefore they are excluded from parliament in the final results. 
                                                          
69 In Finnish: Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue. 
70 In Finnish: Suomen Senioripuolue. 
71 In Finnish: Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue. 
72 As a side note, shutting these two parties out of parliament under any of the electoral region models would 
only require a legal threshold of exclusion of 1 %. That alone would limit representation to parties that can 
win at least two seats in parliament, whereas a 2 % threshold would limit it to parties able to win at least four 
seats in parliament. 
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It is important to note at this point, however, that the overall proportionality of the election 
outcomes under the electoral region models would be higher if no legal thresholds were used. But 
since we have applied the same legal thresholds for all electoral region models, they have no 
impact on the comparison between the systems. 
8.2. Proportionality of the outcomes 
When we turn our attention to proportional seat shares rather than the number of seats of each 
party, we can start properly assessing the proportionality of the results. When we put the 
proportional vote share and seat share of each party side by side, as in Table 2, we can see at a 
glance how proportional (or disproportional) each party’s share of the seats really is under each 
electoral system. 
Table 2. Party vote shares in the 2007 elections and seat shares of each party 
under the different electoral systems. The percentages have been calculated from 
199 seats, which exclude the single-member constituency of Åland. 
 
Parties are denoted with their Finnish abbreviations, the explanations of which are 
presented in Appendix D. 
 
  d’Hondt 
District-by-district 
Roinila–d’Hondt 
Direct-distribution 
Roinila–d’Hondt* 
Party votes, % seats, % seats, % seats, % 
KESK 23,1 25,6 23,1 23,6 
KOK 22,3 25,1 22,6 23,1 
SDP 21,4 22,6 22,1 22,1 
VAS 8,8 8,5 9,0 9,0 
VIHR 8,5 7,5 8,5 8,5 
KD 4,9 3,5 5,0 5,0 
RKP 4,6 4,5 5,0 4,5 
PS 4,1 2,5 4,5 4,0 
 
* The Ministry of Justice proposal is not listed separately, since its result is 
identical to the direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt model. 
 
This table gives us the first useful numerical measurement of proportionality. Comparing each 
party list’s seat share to its share of the votes we can calculate the largest deviation that any one 
party suffers under each of the electoral systems. Though a crude measurement, it gives a 
concrete point of comparison between the systems. In the d’Hondt system the largest deviation is 
2.8 percentage points, which is seen in the overrepresentation gained by the National Coalition 
(KOK73) party. By comparison, in the district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt system the largest 
deviation is only 0.4 percentage points. In the electoral region model proposed by the Ministry of 
                                                          
73 In Finnish: Kansallinen Kokoomus. 
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Justice and in the direct distribution model I have proposed that deviation is slightly higher at 0.8 
percentage points – but still very low compared to the traditional district-bound d’Hondt. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, this table tells us that all of the electoral region systems 
manage to eliminate or significantly reduce underrepresentation for parties in parliament. Under 
the d’Hondt system there are five parties with parliamentary representation that suffer from 
underrepresentation, the largest single negative deviation being a rather significant 1.6 percentage 
points (1.6 % of seats equalling three seats). The district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt system has 
eliminated underrepresentation completely, whereas the direct distribution method and the Ministry 
of Justice proposal both have only two parties that have a smaller portion of seats than votes. The 
remaining underrepresentation in their results (0.2 percentage points for two parties combined) 
doesn’t, however, translate to even one full seat, which makes the remaining underrepresentation 
practically negligible. 
Finally, as we can see from the table, none of the electoral systems produces a perfect 
proportionality between vote and seat shares. This is to be expected, as any electoral system 
necessarily has some level of built-in disproportionality, as was discussed in Chapter 2. In the 
electoral region models that built-in disproportionality is compounded by the use of legal thresholds 
that led to the exclusion of two parties from parliament and the subsequent transfer of two seats to 
parties that wouldn’t have otherwise been entitled to those seats. On the other hand the use of 
electoral alliances in the 2007 election, the effect of which has not been cancelled in this study, 
artificially boosts the proportionality of the traditional, district-bound d’Hondt system.74 Regardless, 
we can observe that the deviation from perfect proportionality between seat and vote shares of 
each party is markedly smaller under the electoral region models than under the district-bound 
d’Hondt system. But to get a more exact measurement for just how much smaller that deviation 
actually is, we will need to turn to more mathematical tools. 
8.3. Mathematical analysis of the proportionality of the outcomes 
In Table 3 we find the indices of disproportionality introduced in Chapter 3 calculated for each 
system. All indices point to a clear difference in the overall proportionality of the electoral systems 
in favor of the electoral region models. 
                                                          
74 Raunio 2006. 
37 
Table 3. Indices of disproportionality for the different electoral systems calculated from the 
seat shares of parties in parliament. Smaller values indicate less disproportionate results. 
 
The formulas used to calculate the indices were introduced in Chapter 3. 
 
System LD I D LSq 
d’Hondt 2,8 1,35 5,42 3,26 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt 0,7 0,29 1,15 0,72 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt* 0,8 0,33 1,31 0,87 
 
* The Ministry of Justice proposal is not listed separately, since its result is identical to the 
direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt model. 
While the largest deviation (LD) gives us a clear-cut comparison of the maximum disproportionality 
affecting individual parties under each system as was discussed above, Rae’s index (I) gives us 
the average deviation from perfect proportionality. For the district-bound d’Hondt system used in 
the actual election that deviation is approximately 1.4 percentage points per party, whereas for the 
electoral region models the deviation is less than 0.4 percentage points for each party. Translated 
into seats, that means an error of more than two seats per party in the 2007 outcome. By contrast, 
under the electoral region models the final seat count for each party deviates from perfectly 
proportional seat distribution only by approximately one half of one seat. 
The Loosemore–Hanby index (D), on the other hand, reveals the results’ aggregate deviation from 
perfect proportionality. In plain English that means the total portion of seats that was not distributed 
proportionally according to the vote shares of the parties. In the 2007 election more than 5 % of the 
seats, meaning ten full seats, went to the ‘wrong’ party. The same error in the electoral region 
models is just two full seats – which just so happens to be the number of seats taken away from 
the two parties excluded by the legal threshold. Thus we can observe that without the artificially 
imposed legal threshold not one full seat would be awarded to the ‘wrong’ party under the electoral 
region models. This is a rather staggering outcome, as the removal of the ‘misallocation’ of ten 
seats from a legislature of 200 seats has the potential to have profound effects on legislative 
dynamics and the balance of power between parties in parliament. 
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Considering that it is impractical to divide portions of a single seat to different parties or to different 
representatives, we can conclude that this complete removal of seat misallocation would amount to 
as perfectly proportional seat distribution as is practically feasible by any electoral system.75 
It is worth pointing out at this point that although the district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
produces the best overall proportionality out of the systems compared here – albeit with a marginal 
real-world difference in seats between it and the other electoral region models and only because of 
the misallocation caused by the artificial thresholds prevent all of the systems from reaching the 
same ‘perfect’ proportionality – it achieves that higher degree of proportionality due to the way we 
removed underrepresentation from its initial results by shuffling a few seats for those parties that 
were allocated less seats than their vote share would have directly entitled them to. As was 
discussed in Chapter 5.4, that same fix is just as easily applicable to the direct-distribution variant 
of the same method. Therefore the indices here reveal the full extent of how that fix affects the 
outcome’s proportionality. 
These calculations however only took into consideration the parties in parliament. When measuring 
the overall proportionality of an electoral system we must also take into consideration those parties 
that are ultimately excluded from parliament. Table 4 presents the indices of disproportionality 
calculated with all parties that contested the elections, regardless of whether they managed to win 
seats in parliament or not. 
Table 4. Indices of disproportionality for the different electoral systems calculated from the 
seat shares of all parties contesting the elections. Smaller values indicate less 
disproportionate results. 
 
The formulas used to calculate the indices were introduced in Chapter 3. 
 
System LD I D LSq 
d’Hondt 2,8 0,71 6,42 3,33 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt 0,7 0,24 2,15 1,00 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt* 0,8 0,26 2,31 1,11 
 
* The Ministry of Justice proposal is not listed separately, since its result is identical to the 
direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt model. 
As we can see when comparing the tables, Rae’s index of average deviation (I) shrinks when more 
parties are brought into the equation, as could be expected. Here we can see why it was sensible 
                                                          
75 Without the legal thresholds all of the electoral region models would have produced an identical result. 
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at first to limit our study to just parties in parliament: The index no longer gives us a meaningful 
measurement about the expected level of under- or overrepresentation of a party that is more than 
marginally popular. 
The Loosemore–Hanby index (D) however continues to represent the number of seats that have 
been ‘misplaced’ to the ‘wrong’ parties against perfect proportionality. As the Loosemore–Hanby 
index measures the aggregate deviation it naturally swells when the number of parties without 
representatives grows along with their combined underrepresentation. The portion of ‘misallocated’ 
seats under the electoral region systems is now over 2 % of the total of 199 seats, which means 
four full seats given to ‘wrong’ parties. We can quickly see that, were it not for the legal threshold, 
this number would actually shrink to just two seats and the result would be just as proportional as 
when only the parties in parliament were included in the calculation. By contrast, even without a 
legal threshold the aggregate deviation for the traditional d’Hondt system swells to over 6 %, which 
is 12 full seats out of the total of 199, when all parties contesting the elections are considered. The 
difference is big enough to have a real impact on government formation and legislation. 
The Gallagher index (LSq), weighing large deviations over smaller ones, on the other hand 
remains almost unchanged for the district-bound d’Hondt, as could have been expected. The much 
higher values it gives for all of the electoral region models as compared to figures in Table 3 results 
again from the legal threshold of exclusion – the disqualified seat shares of the two artificially 
excluded parties are, after all, as big as the largest deviations in the original calculations. Without 
the impact of the thresholds the Gallagher index would remain nearly unchanged. 
8.4. Conclusions on proportionality 
All things considered, the difference in proportionality as measured for just the parties in parliament 
on one hand and for all parties contesting the elections on the other is not that great. Removing the 
artificial threshold of exclusion from the electoral region models would shrink the difference to 
almost non-existent due to the very marginal vote shares of the parties that would still fail to gain 
representation (the hidden threshold of exclusion enforced by the size of the parliament being less 
than 0.5 %). 
When the legal thresholds are in place, as they are in the calculations above, the measured 
difference in proportionality between the different electoral region models is even smaller when all 
parties are included in the calculations than when proportionality was measured with just the 
parties in parliament. Once again it bears reminding that the only reason there is a difference 
between the electoral region models is that we only applied the correction of underrepresentation 
(and of the “less is more” paradox discussed in Chapter 5.4) for one of the three models rather 
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than all of them. That difference naturally goes away if we apply it not just to the district-by-district 
Roinila–d’Hondt system but to the others as well, which is entirely possible even if not in their case 
mandatory. 
All of the index values we have measured for the electoral region models here are very small 
indeed when compared against electoral systems used across the world. Using Gallagher’s least 
squares index (LSq), which is often used in international comparisons of electoral systems, all of 
the electoral regions models presented here would rank at the very top of a global list of most 
proportional electoral systems. In a comparison of the electoral systems of 23 countries in 1991 
and in another comparison of the electoral systems of 21 countries in 2006, Michael Gallagher 
found the LSq averages to be 5.6 and 6.3, respectively – a far cry from the circa 0.5 that the 
electoral region models would score without artificial thresholds. In Gallagher’s comparison only 
one electoral system reached a lower LSq score: South-Africa, which uses two different electoral 
systems to form a 400-member national parliament.76 Arend Lijphart in turn published a 
comparison of 70 electoral systems in 27 countries in 1994. In that study there was also only a 
single electoral system that beat the 0.5 LSq value of the electoral region models – in fact, even 
with proportionality-hindering legal thresholds proposed by the Ministry of Justice in place, only two 
electoral systems in Lijphart’s comparison scored better than the electoral region models 
presented here.77 
This is not a trivial result. It is especially significant for the two variants of the Roinila–d’Hondt 
method which use only one electoral formula to determine the outcome both at the regional and 
district level. Reaching such a high degree of proportionality with conventional electoral systems 
has traditionally required much more complex systems; In practice the seats have had to be 
distributed either in several stages by different formulas at different levels, as in the model 
proposed by the Ministry of Justice, or by using two or more parallel electoral systems in the same 
election.78 Until now, the only alternative to such multi-tiered electoral systems for reaching a level 
of proportionality that is anywhere near what we have seen here has been to either greatly 
increase the size (or “magnitude”) of electoral districts – or to abolish them altogether. The 
electoral region offers not only a simpler solution that is more transparent to the voter, but it also 
allows us to keep small districts as vehicles for geographically proportionate representation, as has 
been the goal in the Finnish electoral reform plans. 
                                                          
76 Gallagher 1991, p. 46 & 2006, p. 621; EISA 2009.  
77 Lijphart 1994, pp. 160–162. 
78 See for instance Paloheimo 2008 and Taagepera 2007, pp. 23–46. 
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9. District level results 
Next we must turn our attention to the results the different electoral systems produce at the district 
level. This includes both the proportionality of the seat distribution between parties in individual 
districts as well as the election of individual candidates. We know from the way the different 
electoral systems allocate the seats from the national level to the districts and on to individual 
candidates that these results are bound to be somewhat different even if the national results would 
be identical, as is the case between the direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt and the Ministry of 
Justice proposal. 
Given that it makes little sense and adds little benefit to present the complete result tables for all 14 
districts here, we will instead take the complete result tables of two of the districts as examples and 
use the indices of disproportionality to analyse the rest. The complete district level results are 
presented in Appendices A and B. 
9.1. Measuring district-level proportionality 
In order to get a useful comparison of the district level proportionality produced by the different 
systems it is naturally necessary to calculate the indices of disproportionality separately for each 
district. However, comparing those results district by district for all four electoral systems under our 
microscope would be an unnecessarily tedious task. Putting all of the districts, electoral systems 
and index values into a single matrix would be possible, but it would only result in an unwieldy 
table that would be too hard to comprehend for the added value it would give us in our quest to 
understand the tangible, real-world differences between the systems. 
What I did instead was to calculate an average of the disproportionality measurements of each 
district for each of the electoral systems, whereby each cell in Table 5 contains the average value 
for all 14 districts for that particular index. 
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Table 5. District-level indices of disproportionality for the different electoral systems. 
Calculations are based on the district-level seat shares of parties in parliament. With the 
exception of the largest deviation (LD), values presented are averages of the index values of 
all 14 districts. Smaller values indicate less disproportionate results. 
 
The formulas used to calculate the indices were introduced in Chapter 3. 
 
System LD I D LSq 
d’Hondt 14,4 2,5 12,2 7,3 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt 18,9 3,5 18,2 11,1 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt 18,1 3,2 17,6 10,9 
d’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer 9,8 1,8 9,1 5,0 
 
Here the proposal by the Ministry of Justice working group has been listed separately, as the 
Hare–Niemayer method it uses to allocate seats into districts produces a distinct result from the 
direct distribution method I have proposed, despite the identical result they produce at the national 
level. 
As we can easily see from the table, here the added complexity of the Hare–Niemayer seat 
distribution method really pays off. While the traditional d’Hondt method produces a better district 
level proportionality than the other electoral region models – as could have been expected since it 
doesn’t have to take into account what happens outside district boundaries – the quota-based 
Hare–Niemayer method absolutely trumps it. That it does so despite the electoral region model it 
uses to calculate the national-level results is truly remarkable. 
What this means in plain English is that the combination of the d’Hondt formula and the Hare–
Niemayer method as proposed by the Ministry of Justice working group produces better 
proportionality than the traditional, district-bound d’Hondt method at both the national and the 
district levels. This may be a redeeming quality for its otherwise seemingly unnecessary 
complexity, but this benefit naturally has to be weighed against the penalty of making the electoral 
system that much harder to understand for the ordinary voter. 
However, since the districts used in Finland vary quite considerably in their magnitude – ranging 
from small six-member constituencies of eastern Finland to the 34-member constituency of the 
capital region of Uusimaa – the average figures presented in Table 5 do a poor job at accurately 
representing proportionality in the smallest districts. It is therefore necessary and useful to take a 
look at a few of the districts with the smallest numbers of elected representatives. This gives us a 
better idea of how well the different electoral systems function in small districts and whether the 
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election of candidates from those districts is proportionate to the vote shares of their parties and 
thus representative of the stated will of the electorate. Table 6 gives the indices of 
disproportionality measured as an average for three of the smallest districts. Two of the districts 
have a district magnitude of six, while the third elects seven representatives to parliament. 
Table 6. District-level indices of disproportionality for the different electoral systems 
calculated for the three smallest districts. Calculations are based on the district-level seat 
shares of parties in parliament. With the exception of the largest deviation (LD), values 
presented are averages of the index values of Pohjois-Karjala, Etelä-Savo and Lappi 
districts. Smaller values indicate less disproportionate results. 
 
The formulas used to calculate the indices were introduced in Chapter 3. 
 
System LD I D LSq 
d’Hondt 14,4 5,8 17,7 11,4 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt 18,9 7,9 24,7 16,4 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt 14,9 6,4 20,2 13,3 
Hare–Niemayer 9,8 3,8 11,6 6,9 
 
Unsurprisingly, given their small district magnitudes, these three districts were by far the worst 
offenders in terms of proportionality in all of the electoral systems. For comparison, the average 
deviation measured as Rae’s index (I) for the largest of the districts remained well below 1.0 for all 
electoral systems. Their largest deviation likewise never reached 7.0 under any of our electoral 
systems while remaining a very low 1.8 with the Hare–Niemayer method. These figures, when 
compared to the numbers in Table 6, illustrate quite clearly how big of a limiting factor district 
magnitude can be for proportionality. Contrast these values with the results achieved by all of the 
electoral region models at the national level in the previous chapter, and you can see what 
difference it makes to have nearly two hundred seats to distribute instead of just six or seven. 
Simply put, electoral proportionality needs room to grow.79 
Thus, if we judge the proportionality of the district level results in absolute rather than comparative 
terms, the level of proportionality afforded by any of the electoral systems under our comparison is 
rather abysmal. The index values produced by the Hare–Niemayer method here really only look 
good by comparison to values that are even worse. It, too, only achieves decent proportionality in 
large districts with ten or more seats; in smaller districts there simply aren’t enough seats for truly 
                                                          
79 For a more detailed study on how district magnitude affects district level (as well as supra-district) 
proportionality, see Taagepera & Shugart 1989, pp. 117–125. 
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proportional distribution. The level of proportionality it achieves in those larger districts is, however, 
truly remarkable – even compared to district-bound electoral systems. 
There is one crucial standard of proportionality that we yet haven’t looked at, and that only the 
Hare–Niemayer method, out of all of our electoral systems, successfully clears: In no district does 
it allow a party to win more seats than another party that received more votes. This phenomenon 
happens with both variations of the Roinila–d’Hondt method due to the way the seats are shuffled 
from one district to another when a district is already full or when correcting for 
underrepresentation. In fact, if we look at the largest district of Uusimaa with is 34 seats, in 
Appendix B, we can see that the Roinila–d’Hondt method in both its variations awards more seats 
to a party that won circa four percent of the district vote than to parties that received over 10 
percent of the vote. While such extreme disproportionality may suddenly feel unpalatable from the 
point of view of democracy, it only occurs because the smaller party could not get its “fair share” of 
seats from other districts. The same phenomenon of a party winning more seats than its 
competitors with less votes also occurs with some frequency with the widely used traditional 
d’Hondt system, although for different reasons, so it does not necessarily pose a problem for 
democratic legitimacy. Nevertheless, in this crude test of proportionality only the Hare–Niemayer 
method passes the requirement for consistent proportionality at the district level. 
There is a debate to be had about the importance of district level proportionality to begin with, 
however. If the purpose of the election is to elect a national legislature (or equivalent) with a seat 
distribution that is proportional to the vote shares of each party, does the proportionality of the 
district level results matter? At least in the Finnish system of governance the district 
representatives never convene to decide or to legislate on anything amongst themselves; the 
districts exist solely to provide representatives from all parts of the country. That is to say that the 
seat shares the parties received in one particular district do not matter – what matters is seat 
distribution in the legislature, and that seat distribution is in all of the electoral region models 
decided independently from the seat distribution inside the districts.80 
More relevant to the dynamics of legislation than district level proportionality is the question of 
which individual candidates get elected, and whether that reflects the expressed will of their 
districts’ voters. This aspect is perhaps likely to be considered more important by the voters as 
                                                          
80 District-level seat distribution only affects the national-level seat distribution to some extent in the first 
phase of the district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method, but even there any underrepresentation suffered by 
any parties in parliament are corrected based on the national-level results. 
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well, since in an open-list system they are expected to express their preference not only between 
parties, but between individual candidates.81 
9.2. A look into the election of individual candidates 
The different electoral systems under inspection here each produce a markedly different selection 
of Members of Parliament. This occurs even between the electoral region models despite their 
near-identical seat distribution between parties at the national level. It is therefore perhaps 
revealing of their ability to reflect the expressed will of the voters to take a closer look at who, 
specifically, gets elected and who doesn’t in each of the systems. Of course, it would be a 
gargantuan effort to go through each and every point of difference in candidate selection between 
the systems in these pages. Fortunately it is also largely unnecessary. I will, however, highlight a 
few of the more interesting discrepancies that I think will help illustrate the very significant 
differences in the way the systems translate votes into seats for particular candidates. 
If we look at the charts in Appendix A, which show the candidates elected under each of the 
electoral systems side-by-side, we can see at a glance that in most districts the differences in who 
gets elected are rather few. Indeed, in most districts only one or two seats change candidates, 
while in some there is no change. Even in the largest district, Uusimaa, where there are 34 seats 
up for grabs, only five seats change ownership when we swap from the district-bound d’Hondt 
system to either of the Roinila–d’Hondt models – and only one if the Hare–Niemayer method is 
used instead. So, apart from the effect it has on the district level proportionality, it is not the 
absolute number of changes that make them significant. Indeed, the small number of changes 
could be used to argue in favor of the reform since the better overall proportionality does not come 
at the cost of dramatically different electoral dynamics at the district level. There is clearly no need 
for the voters to dramatically change their voting behaviour or to feel anxiety if the traditional 
d’Hondt method was scrapped in favor of any of the electoral region models. 
The few changes that do occur are, however, rather interesting if we look strictly at the individual 
candidates who get elected or left out of parliament under each system, as well as their respective 
vote counts. As should be expected, under none of the electoral systems we have looked at can 
candidates be certain to be elected simply because they received the most personal votes in their 
                                                          
81 This is mostly a debate and an issue for electoral research that cannot be covered in depth in these 
pages. For the purposes of our analysis it is, however, prudent to keep in mind as one of the aspects that 
must be considered when deciding on which features of an electoral system are to be judged more important 
than others. For further discussion about the effects of electoral systems on voter choice as well as on voter 
behavior and voter preferences, see for instance Borg & Paloheimo 2009; Taagepera & Shugart 1989; and 
Renwick 2010.  
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district – let alone if they merely rank among the most voted candidates but are not the most 
popular candidate of their district. As seats are allocated to parties according the total number of 
votes received by each party, a candidate’s high personal vote tally is only a secondary 
consideration in who gets elected. That said, all of the systems end up primarily electing 
candidates in the order of their personal vote counts. In other words, the candidate selection in all 
of the systems mostly follows what we would see under an SNTV voting system where party 
affiliation is ignored and candidates are elected only according to their personal votes. As we can 
see from the tables in Appendix A, the candidates who receive the most votes tend to get elected 
in all of the electoral systems despite their party-proportional seat distribution. The exceptions to 
that rule are seats that are assigned to less-voted-for parties and candidates in the name of 
proportionality – something that would not occur in an SNTV or STV system. 
Looking at how many times the results of each system deviate from the ‘SNTV-like’ results of 
candidates with the most votes getting elected gives us a new measurement that is almost as easy 
to generate as it is to understand; The number of deviations effectively tells us how many times an 
electoral system overrules the candidate preference of voters in favor of their preference over 
parties. Table 7 gives an example table from Appendix A with the results of one of the smaller 
districts, Pohjois-Karjala: 
Table 7. Election results from the district of Pohjois-Karjala calculated with the different electoral 
systems. District magnitude of the district is 6. Candidates are listed in the order of their personal 
vote counts from the highest to the lowest. 
 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Lahtela, Esa SDP 10 813 29 105 ■ 99 032 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
2. Cronberg, Tarja VIHR 7 804 9 955  58 607 ■ ■ VIHR-1 ■ 
3. Vehviläinen, Anu KESK 6 789 30 391 ■ 35 579 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
4. Hoskonen, Hannu KESK 5 982 15 196 ■ 25 617 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
5. Reijonen, Eero KESK 5 021 10 130 ■ 12 809     
6. Ravi, Pekka KOK 4 589 15 043 ■ 18 692 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
7. Kämäräinen, Matti KESK 4 534 7 598  10 855     
8. Kähkönen, Lauri SDP 4 391 14 553 ■ 11 211   SDP-2 ■ 
9. Tahvanainen, Säde SDP 3 359 9 702  8 869     
…           
14. Leppänen, Urpo PS 1 975 3 761  14 032 ■ ■   
  
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with the d’Hondt method. 
3 ■ Elected with the district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method. 
4 ■ Elected with the direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method. 
5 ■ Elected with the Hare-Niemayer quotas. 
The candidates in Table 7 are listed in the order of who received the most personal votes. With the 
colored squares indicating who got elected with each electoral system, we can quickly see how 
many times each electoral system deviates from a purely personal-vote-based election. Given that 
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the district has six seats up for grabs, the six candidates with the most votes are the candidates 
who would get elected under an SNTV voting system.82 Contrast this to the actual outcome of the 
2007 elections (in orange) or to the simulated results of the different electoral region models (blue 
and green), and we can observe that all of them deviated from that ‘SNTV-like’ seat distribution by 
one seat. (Note that with the traditional d’Hondt system the second-most voted candidate in the 
entire district failed to get elected – we will return to that particular case in a moment.) 
In the case of Pohjois-Karjala, then, the number of deviations from the voter preference of 
candidates is equal among all four systems, even if they differ in who gets elected. If we go 
through all of the districts and sum up the deviations for each system, we will get an idea about 
which of systems most closely follows the strict voter preference over candidates: The district-
bound d’Hondt differs from the district-level candidate preference of voters a total of 23 times, the 
district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 20 times, the direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
21 times, and the Hare–Niemayer method 28 times. 
These numbers lead us to two conclusions. First, all systems produce a remarkably similar 
outcome to what could be expected of an SNTV system when it comes to the election of individual 
candidates;83 only 10–14 percent of all candidates who would presumably get elected if only their 
personal votes mattered fail to get elected when we also take into account the party-list votes and 
party-proportional seat distribution. That is, of course, a significant number in and of itself as it is 
enough to decisively alter the legislative balance of power between parties, but it still means that 
over 85 percent of all candidates elected under any of our systems are likely to be candidates who 
were among the most voted for in their respective districts. Thus, all of the systems reflect and 
respect voter preferences over individual candidates quite well. 
This observation brings us to our second conclusion on candidate selection. If we look at the 
number of deviations under each system and then look back to the district level proportionality of 
those systems, we can see that the tables have turned yet again; While the Hare–Niemayer 
method produced by far the most proportional seat distribution among parties at the district level, 
here it deviates the most from the candidate preferences of the voters. By contrast, the system with 
the worst district level proportionality, the district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method, is the most 
                                                          
82 Of course we cannot truly expect the candidates who received the most individual votes under a d’Hondt 
system to also receive the highest number of votes in an SNTV system, for the different voting mechanisms 
of SNTV would encourage different voter behavior. However, we can reasonably expect that the most 
preferred candidates under the d’Hondt system would be quite popular under an SNTV system as well, and 
that the SNTV results would look broadly similar to the most-voted-for list under d’Hondt. 
83 Again not taking into account that the use of an SNTV voting system would alter voter behavior and likely 
lead to a consolidation of votes to fewer candidates. 
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faithful to voters’ candidate preferences. Thus it can be concluded that greater district level 
proportionality comes at the cost of a greater mismatch between who the voters vote and who gets 
elected. 
Granted, the result of the Hare–Niemayer method differs from that of the two Roinila–d’Hondt 
methods by only seven or eight candidates depending on which variant it is compared to. It is not 
an Earth-shattering difference in a parliament of 199 elected representatives. But when judging 
which system best reflects the will of the voters, we need to consider the voters’ candidate 
preferences as much as district level proportionality. Which of them is ultimately more relevant to 
the voters is certainly debatable – and probably highly variable – but not something we can solve 
here. Suffice to say that no electoral system can achieve proportional seat distribution among 
parties while at the same time faithfully replicating voters’ preferences over individual candidates, 
except by accident; it is a choice of priorities that has to be made when balancing the pros and 
cons of different electoral systems. 
9.3. Two case studies 
In Table 7 we noticed that the candidate who received the second-most votes of all candidates in 
the Pohjois-Karjala district, Tarja Cronberg of the Greens (VIHR84), failed to get elected under the 
traditional district-bound d’Hondt system. This was actually a minor real-life scandal in Finland in 
the aftermath of the 2007 elections, as it so clearly highlighted the shortcomings of the d’Hondt 
method. It was the outcome of the huge bias that the d’Hondt method exhibits in favor of large 
parties in small districts, whereby less-popular parties may fail to get even a single candidate 
elected even if that one candidate gets more votes than anyone else in the district.85 
Cronberg’s non-election also highlighted the rather problematic feature in the electoral system that 
a candidate with nearly 8 000 votes in one of the smallest districts cannot win a seat while a 
candidate from a far more populous district could get elected with barely over 1 000 votes.86 While 
it can be argued, and justly so, that the election is not only about which candidate gets the most 
                                                          
84 In Finnish: Vihreät. 
85 As it happened, Cronberg received only the second-most votes in the district, but she wouldn’t have been 
elected even if the most-voted-for candidate had received less votes than her. This was often overlooked in 
the debate that followed the 2007 elections. 
86 Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner was elected from Uusimaa district with just 1 058 votes (See Appendix A). She 
qualified for parliament from the 93rd place in a 34-member constituency even as Cronberg failed to qualify 
from the 2nd place of her 6-member constituency. 
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votes, such occurrences may nevertheless risk disenfranchising the voters of smaller districts and 
the supporters of smaller parties.87 
As we can see from Table 7, the use of any of the electoral region models would avoid such 
‘injustice’. Under the Roinila–d’Hondt method Cronberg would either have been the fourth member 
of her party to get elected or to have received the fourth-largest distribution figure of her party, 
depending on the variant used, since she was the fourth-most-voted-for candidate of her party in 
the entire country. This would have made her practically certain to get elected, given that the party 
would have received 17 seats in total under either of the Roinila–d’Hondt variants. Figuring out 
how certain her election would have been under the Hare–Niemayer method is far more difficult: 
Her party received the last seat of the district with a comparison of the fractional remainders of the 
seat quotas, and as the adequacy of the size of that remainder depends on a whole host of other 
factors, it becomes exceedingly difficult to calculate how much the voting result should have 
changed for her party to lose that last seat in the district.88 This serves as an example of just how 
much more difficult it may be for the voters to understand the causes and effects behind the 
election or non-election of a particular candidate when the Hare–Niemayer method is used instead 
of the plain d’Hondt distribution figures. 
Regardless of the electoral region system used, Cronberg’s election as an individual does not 
directly raise the number of seats her party would win compared to the historical outcome 
produced by the traditional d’Hondt system, but rather she would be elected in place of some less-
voted-for candidate from the same party. Who that someone is varies depending on the seat 
distribution system used, but in every case he or she is guaranteed to have received less votes, 
and likely from a more populous district, than Cronberg. I dare argue that that is more in line with 
the principles of democracy than the historical outcome produced by the district-bound d’Hondt 
method, which left a candidate who received more votes than almost four fifths of the elected 
candidates – both in her district and in the entire country – unelected. 
To illustrate that the Cronberg case is not just an isolated anomaly or something that can occur 
only in small districts, the 2007 election results conveniently provide us another similar, albeit much 
less discussed, case. That is the case of Sari Essayah of the Christian Democrats (KD89), in the 
district of Varsinais-Suomi. As we can see from the following table, Varsinais-Suomi has a district 
magnitude of 17, making it one of the largest in Finland. 
                                                          
87 Borg & Paloheimo 2009, pp. 243–276. 
88 In the Hare–Niemayer system she would technically get her seat with her personal vote tally after her party 
was allocated one seat in the district with the quota system, but as she received the most votes of her party 
in her district she automatically receives the first seat assigned to her party there. 
89 In Finnish: Kristillisdemokraatit. 
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Table 8. Election results from the district of Varsinais-Suomi calculated with the different electoral 
systems. District magnitude of the district is 17. Candidates are listed in the order of their personal 
vote counts from the highest to the lowest. 
           
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Wallin, Stefan RKP 12 097 51 979 ■ 126 520 ■ ■ RKP-1 ■ 
2. Paasio, Heli SDP 11 233 53 281 ■ 148 549 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
3. Kanerva, Ilkka KOK 11 079 66 793 ■ 154 210 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
4. Essayah, Sari KD 7 734 11 377  44 930 ■ ■ KD-1 ■ 
5. Koskinen, Marjaana SDP 7 649 26 641 ■ 45 707 ■ ■ SDP-2 ■ 
6. Kaunisto, Timo KESK 7 213 25 990 ■ 45 745 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
7. Virolainen, Anne-Mari KOK 6 812 33 397 ■ 47 449 ■ ■ KOK-2 ■ 
8. Kiviranta, Esko KESK 6 210 17 326 ■ 29 110 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
9. Hemmilä, Pertti KOK 6 188 22 264 ■ 28 038 ■ ■ KOK-3 ■ 
10. Hyssälä, Liisa KESK 6 152 12 995 ■ 27 845 ■ ■ KESK-3 ■ 
11. Orpo, Petteri KOK 6 069 16 698 ■ 25 702 ■ ■ KOK-4 ■ 
12. Taimela, Katja SDP 5 984 17 760 ■ 24 758 ■ ■ SDP-3 ■ 
13. Andersson, Janina VIHR 5 587 22 868 ■ 39 072 ■ ■ VIHR-1 ■ 
14. Lapintie, Annika VAS 5 575 25 937 ■ 30 537 ■ ■ VAS-1 ■ 
15. Niinistö, Ville VIHR 5 182 11 434 ■ 26 048 ■ ■   
16. Kantola, Ilkka SDP 5 091 13 320 ■ 15 236   SDP-4 ■ 
17. Laxell, Jouko KOK 5 056 13 359 ■ 22 030 ■ ■ KOK-5 ■ 
18. Salo, Mauri KESK 4 877 10 396  12 084     
19. Puisto, Virpa SDP 4 743 10 656  12 642     
20. Lehtinen, Seppo SDP 4 716 8 880  12 379     
21. Huovinen, Pentti KOK 4 700 11 132  20 561 ■ ■   
22. Perho, Maija KOK 4 602 9 542  19 276     
23. Yrttiaho, Jyrki VAS 4 492 12 969 ■ 17 450   VAS-2 ■ 
24. Immonen, Mikko VAS 4 113 8 646  16 286     
25. Helminen, Sari SDP 3 962 7 612  10 804     
  
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with the d’Hondt method. 
3 ■ Elected with the district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method. 
4 ■ Elected with the direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method. 
5 ■ Elected with the Hare-Niemayer method. 
As we can see from Table 8, Sari Essayah received the fourth-most votes of any candidate in her 
district. She was also the third-most-voted-for candidate of her party in the entire country, 
separated from the second place by less than a hundred votes. Regardless, under the district-
bound d’Hondt system she failed to get elected. This despite the fact that another candidate from 
the same party was elected to parliament from another district with less than a fourth of her 
votes.90 If any of the electoral region models were used instead, she would have been practically 
guaranteed a seat in parliament due to her high ranking on her party’s list as well due to her small 
party winning over 40 percent more seats than under the d’Hondt system overall. 
                                                          
90 Sari Palm was elected from the district of Kymi with only 1 749 votes. See Appendix A. 
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Essayah’s case is one where we can plainly see what causes underrepresentation in the d’Hondt 
system and other district-bound systems like it; the handicap they place on smaller parties – or just 
parties with a more fragmented support base – is nearly insurmountable, no matter how popular 
their individual candidates are. As long as the support of a less popular party isn’t heavily focused 
into one or two districts, they have no hope of competing with larger parties on equal terms. Since 
ideological or political differences are not always defined by geography, this feature puts different 
parties at massively different handicaps. It’s as if the fastest runners on a Marathon had their finish 
line drawn at the 30-kilometer mark and the rest of the pack were expected to compete with them 
by running the full length of the race. 
These two brief case studies reveal little about the differences between the different single-
electoral-region models that we set out to compare. They do, however, make a strong practical 
case in favor of the electoral region concept as such when compared to the traditional d’Hondt 
method or, by extension, any other district-bound system of proportional representation. 
Another new aspect that these case studies reveal is that it is not only the number of deviations 
from voters’ candidate preferences that matters, but also where in the pack those deviations occur; 
Despite the Hare–Niemayer method deviating from the voters’ strict candidate preferences more 
often than the district-bound d’Hondt system, it never disqualified a candidate who was among the 
most voted in any given district – unlike the d’Hondt method. We can therefore conclude that these 
two case studies quite clearly put to rest any worries that the adoption of the electoral region would 
lead to results that are less in line with voter preferences in individual districts than the results 
produced by single-district electoral systems. We can safely say that the opposite is true, and that 
the electoral region concept is far more likely to lead to the election of candidates that the voters 
actually voted for. 
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10. Conclusions 
We set out to compare the national and district level proportionality of three different electoral 
systems based on the concept of a single nation-wide electoral region, and also looked at how the 
systems differ in the election of individual candidates. What did we learn? The three new electoral 
systems that we put under our microscope, as well as the d’Hondt system that we used as a 
standard of comparison, all have their unique strengths and weaknesses that make them shine in 
one area but show some lackluster performance in another. By their very nature all electoral 
systems are necessarily compromises between different features which all result in different 
outcomes. Often one desirable feature comes at the cost of another, whether that cost is added 
complexity, less proportional district level results, less proportional overall results, or results where 
the election of candidates corresponds little with the number of votes they personally received. 
Ultimately, the decision on which aspects of an electoral system are deemed more important than 
others is a political one, and one for which there is no final answer. While Alan Renwick’s list of 
outcomes that electoral systems should produce in a democracy91 is a good starting point for 
evaluating the merits of any electoral system, they are in some ways contradictory with one 
another in such a way that no single electoral system can perfect them all at the same time. We 
cannot therefore conclude which of the electoral systems presented here performs ‘better’ than 
others overall, as each has features which may be deemed undesirable in one context yet be 
found beneficial in another. The selection of an electoral system is never a purely technical one, 
but always political. We can help make that political value judgment a little easier by summarizing 
the different characteristics we have identified for the different electoral region models. 
10.1. Comparing the electoral region models to traditional electoral systems 
First we can identify what the three electoral region models have in common that separates them 
from the district-bound d’Hondt system and other traditional electoral systems. As we saw in 
Chapter 8, all of the electoral region models produce a markedly better proportionality at the 
national level than the standard d’Hondt system. In fact, we saw them producing better overall 
                                                          
91 Namely: “Fair distribution of seats, avoidance of anomalous results, fair distribution of power, 
representation of society, voter choice, accountability of governments, accountability of individual politicians, 
checks and balances, encouraging effective political parties [and] simplicity”. Renwick 2010, p. 39. 
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proportionality than any other electoral system in the world today, when we take into account the 
district magnitudes and the total number of seats in parliament that we used in our calculations.92 
The electoral region concept itself is the only system known to widely available, English-language 
political science literature that achieves near perfect proportionality with such a low average district 
magnitude93 without the need to have multi-tiered elections or to run multiple electoral systems 
side-by-side. With the complete94 elimination of underrepresentation from all parties in parliament 
using the Roinila–d’Hondt method, we observed as perfectly proportional seat distribution as is 
practically feasible in any electoral system; As all parties elected to parliament received at least as 
many seats as their share of all votes cast indicated, and as the remaining disproportionality of the 
seat distribution amounted to less than a half-a-seat per party on average, it is practically 
impossible to get a consistently better proportional seat distribution between parties than what the 
Roinila–d’Hondt method produces. 
The electoral region model does add some complexity over traditional single-district electoral 
systems such as the d’Hondt system. However, relative to the d’Hondt method, all of our electoral 
region models change only the mathematics of the seat distribution, not the act of voting itself; 
Voters continue to cast only a single vote in favor of a single candidate and a party in a single 
district, just as in the traditional d’Hondt system. And as the Roinila–d’Hondt method demonstrated, 
this can be done by using only one electoral formula which, at its core, is no more complex than 
the original d’Hondt formula it is based on.95 This makes the electoral region concept far simpler 
than the many multi-tiered electoral systems it could replace.96 As simplicity was one of the key 
traits identified for electoral systems in representative democracies by Alan Renwick, as well as by 
the working group set to study the alternatives for electoral reform in Finland, this is a significant 
observation.97 
Finally, we saw that the electoral region concept increases voter choice over both individual 
candidates and parties; As votes cast in one district influence the election results in all districts, 
voters will have to worry less about ‘wasting’ their votes on a party that will ultimately fail to get 
even a single candidate elected in their district. Voters may therefore contemplate on voting for 
candidates and parties who they previously could not have voted without a serious risk of seeing 
                                                          
92 The South African electoral system which beat the LSq score of circa 0.5 of the electoral region models 
achieves its result by electing twice the number of representatives with two different electoral systems. 
93 199 seats distributed into 14 districts with an average district magnitude of 14.2. 
94 Where underrepresentation is eliminated either entirely or to a fraction of a single seat. See Chapter 8.3. 
95 See Chapter 5.2 for full description of the system. 
96 For an array of dizzyingly complex electoral systems that are actually being used around the world, see 
Taagepera 2007, pp. 23–46; and Taagepera & Shugart 1989, pp. 20–36, 127–133. 
97 Renwick 2010, pp. 38–42; OMKM 2008:2, p. 44. 
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their vote go to waste. On the other hand parties that may have previously forgone contesting the 
elections in districts where their chances of gaining seats were very low would, under the electoral 
region model, stand to benefit from all of their votes even in districts where their candidates would 
not get elected. This would encourage them to register candidates in more districts, thus further 
expanding voter choice. This expansion of voter choice from two directions is especially beneficial 
to small parties with either a very fragmented or a heavily concentrated voter base, as they would 
benefit from all of the votes they received even if they couldn’t get their candidates elected in every 
district they contested. 
But what about the difference between the different electoral region models? Achilles Westling’s 
“spiral model” was not included in this study, but the three systems we did compare produced 
overall election results that were either identical with one another or nearly so. Where they differed 
was at the district level and in which individual candidates made the cut. 
10.2. Comparing the electoral region models with one another 
All of the multitude differences in the formulas and methods of the three electoral region models 
that we studied here lead, in the end, to only two major points of difference: District-level 
proportionality and the simplicity or complexity of each system. 
Where the proposed combination of d’Hondt and Hare–Niemayer formulas by the Ministry of 
Justice working group leads to an unmatched level of proportionality at the district level, its use of 
two different formulas in two distinct phases makes the system far more difficult to understand to 
both the expert and the layman alike. This was recognized also by the working group itself, 
although it duly noted that the use of computers will make calculating and verifying the election 
result easy regardless.98 True as it is, the use of computers to generate the election outcome 
makes it no less difficult for the average voter to understand – let alone to calculate – how their 
vote actually translates into a particular candidate being elected.99 
For all its complexity, the combination of the d’Hondt and Hare–Niemayer methods is nevertheless 
far simpler than many of the multi-tiered electoral systems used around the world today. Many 
countries employ two or more parallel electoral systems in a single election in order to boost the 
proportionality of the seat distribution between parties while maintaining small districts as vehicles 
                                                          
98 OMKM 2008:2, p. 26. 
99 The working group estimated that calculating the seat distribution with the aid of Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets takes approximately half an hour – that’s presumably if you already know precisely what you 
are supposed to do. OMKM 2008:2, p. 26. 
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of regional representation.100 Even with the combination of the d’Hondt and Hare–Niemayer 
methods, the electoral region model of the Ministry of Justice working group achieves both goals 
with a far simpler solution: The voter need only cast one vote in one district instead of two or more 
separate ballots for separate elections at different levels. But if simplicity is desired, the Roinila–
d’Hondt method in either of its variations achieves the same or better proportionality with the use of 
only one electoral formula and a method that is almost as straightforward as the traditional and 
widely used d’Hondt method. 
The trade-off for simplicity in the Roinila–d’Hondt method is that it really doesn’t pay attention to 
proportional seat distribution among parties at the district level. In that regard it doesn’t come close 
to even the traditional d’Hondt method, whereas the Hare–Niemayer method produces a district-
level seat distribution that far surpasses even the original d’Hondt system in proportionality. If that 
is a feature that is to be given a high priority, then the winner of this comparison is quite clear: The 
combination of a single nation-wide electoral region, the d’Hondt formula and the Hare–Niemayer 
method produces a seat distribution whose proportionality at both the national and the district 
levels is very likely unmatched by any other electoral system in the world that doesn’t employ 
multiple electoral systems or multiple parallel elections.101 
The Roinila–d’Hondt method, while largely ignoring proportional seat distribution at the district 
level, is on the other hand more faithful to the voters’ preferences over individual candidates, 
making fewer exceptions to electing the most-voted-for candidates of a given district. In practical 
terms, when two candidates from the same district are competing for that one final seat left in the 
district, the Roinila–d’Hondt method is more likely to favor the candidate who received more 
personal votes. The Hare–Niemayer method, by contrast, is more likely to pick either of the 
candidates seemingly at random, because its outcome is less influenced by the number of 
personal votes acquired by each candidate than it is by the abstract fractional seat quota given to 
each party in the district. 
Without understanding all the underlying mathematics, an ordinary voter observing the results of 
the Roinila–d’Hondt system may intuitively conclude that one candidate won instead of another 
because they had received more votes and therefore held the higher distribution figure, which in 
turn entitled them to the seat. If instead the same voter was observing the results of the Hare–
                                                          
100 See for instance Taagepera 2007, pp. 23–46; and Taagepera & Shugart 1989, pp. 20–36, 127–133. 
 
101 Reaching a similar level of proportionality at both the national and district levels is possible by distributing 
a part of the seats at the national level with one electoral system and another part of the seats at the district 
level with another. This obviously makes the system far more complex, however, and doesn’t help with 
reducing the number of wasted votes unlike the electoral region model. 
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Niemayer system, they might intuitively conclude that the candidate was elected because her party 
won more votes and therefore more seats in the district than the party of the competing candidate. 
Both interpretations would likely be correct and they could both be considered equally legitimate 
reasons for an individual candidate to get elected – even as both outcomes could happen with the 
exact same voting result, the deciding factor in such a case being not the voting result per se but 
rather the electoral system itself. 
10.3. Final notes 
While the example of the previous paragraph illustrates perhaps the key difference between the 
Hare–Niemayer and Roinila–d’Hondt methods, it also highlights the careful consideration that 
electoral systems and their features must be given. Through such seemingly minor distinctions or 
technical differences they may shape the political landscape and ultimately the laws of a society 
even more than the voters’ ballots. The mathematical formulas or other finer details of electoral 
systems may never be of much interest to most voters or even to most politicians, but as 
Taagepera once observed, they can indeed “make or break” entire nations – and they can certainly 
change election results. 
The novel concept of district-linking electoral regions is therefore not a trivial development or only a 
technical curiosity. Should it be adopted in any of its variations, it may well end up transforming 
political landscapes and ushering in new political realities wherever it is adopted. At the very least it 
offers countries and politicians new choices in electoral systems that they previously didn’t have, 
even as it gives political scientists engaged in electoral research a new branch to study and a new 
electoral concept to develop further. Even if never adopted, it sets a new benchmark in 
proportionality for all existing and future systems of proportional representation. 
Whichever of the three electoral region models we have compared here would end up being 
adopted, the adoption of the electoral region itself creates greater proportionality, reduces the 
effect of small district magnitudes, and puts candidates from different parties and different districts 
on a more equal footing with one another. All of this results in an election result that is more in line 
with the will of the voters, whether we look at the number of seats allocated to each party or at the 
individual elected representatives. 
As such, the electoral region concept offers a viable option for any country that opts for party-list 
proportional representation and wishes to use multiple districts to ensure representation from all 
parts of the country. But the electoral region concept is not limited only to national elections with 
sub-national districts. Looking beyond the national level, the electoral region concept could just as 
well be adopted for federal elections, such as for the elections to the European Parliament, to the 
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United States Congress, or to the German Bundestag. If applied to the elections to the European 
Parliament, for instance, the electoral region concept would allow voters in all member states to 
cast their votes directly in support of union-wide party lists while still electing their own national 
candidates from their own country or its sub-national districts. This would effectively transform the 
separate elections of each of the 28 member states into a single, Europe-wide election.102  
Nor are the practical applications of the electoral region concept by no means limited to the three 
electoral systems we studied in this paper, or even to the three others that were only briefly 
discussed. Despite the fact that all of the systems presented in this paper were based on the 
d’Hondt formula, the electoral region concept could well be adapted to be used with any number of 
other electoral formulas or combinations thereof. There may even be entirely novel applications 
waiting to be discovered which will beat all of the aforementioned models not only in national and 
district level proportionality, but also in simplicity. If there already exists a dizzying array of electoral 
systems for countries to choose from now, the electoral region concept opens the door for many 
more to come.  
                                                          
102 This would have the benefit of promoting the creation of more cohesive and truly pan-European European 
political parties, while at the same ensuring a more proportional seat distribution between those parties in the 
European Parliament. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Election results by district 
Etelä-Savo 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Viitamies, Pauliina SDP 6 690 29 837 ■ 33 011 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
2. Komi, Katri KESK 5 885 30 759 ■ 22 872 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
3. Leppä, Jari KESK 5 762 15 380 ■ 20 659 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
4. Järvinen, Heli VIHR 5 525 14 919 ■ 33 490 ■ ■ VIHR-1 ■ 
5. Nousiainen, Pekka KESK 5 267 10 253  13 922 – ■   
6. Backman, Jouni SDP 5 259 9 946  18 006 ■ ■ SDP-2 ■ 
7. Seppälä, Arto SDP 3 955 7 459  10 611     
8. Nepponen, Olli KOK 3 728 21 108 ■ 11 862   KOK-1 ■ 
9. Korhonen, Seija KESK 3 401 7 690  8 539     
10. Toivakka, Lenita KOK 3 233 10 554 ■ 10 112     
11. Riikonen, Teuvo V. KD 2 454 7 036  11 233     
12. Nenonen, Jukka KESK 2 432 6 152  6 671     
13. Linnamurto, Saku KOK 2 369 5 277  7 432     
14. Oksa, Pertti KOK 2 123 4 222  6 633     
15. Kakriainen, Markku KESK 1 954 5 127  6 099     
16. Pehkonen, Tauno PS 1 865 3 518  12 473 ■    
17. Ojala, Sakari SDP 1 716 5 967  5 451     
18. Wright, Helena KOK 1 485 3 015  5 140     
19. Taavitsainen, Satu SDP 1 395 4 973  4 993     
20. Tulla, Matti KESK 1 295 4 394  5 043     
21. Suomalainen, Ritva SDP 1 241 4 262  4 679     
22. Koivikko, Jyrki  KOK 1 015 2 639  4 254     
 
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with the d’Hondt method. 
3 ■ Elected with the district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method. 
– Disqualified due to correction of underrepresentation. 
4 ■ Elected with the direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method. 
5 ■ Elected with the Hare-Niemayer method. 
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Helsinki 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Zyskowicz, Ben   KOK 17 607 94 581 ■ 308 421 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
2. Tuomioja, Erkki  SDP 12 894 67 122 ■ 594 194 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
3. Heinäluoma, Eero  SDP 10 948 33 561 ■ 118 839 ■ ■ SDP-2 ■ 
4. Brax, Tuija  VIHR 9 692 63 440 ■ 117 215 ■ ■ VIHR-1 ■ 
5. Sarkomaa, Sari  KOK 9 155 47 291 ■ 88 120 ■ ■ KOK-2 ■ 
6. Vapaavuori, Jan  KOK 9 091 31 527 ■ 77 105 ■ ■ KOK-3 ■ 
7. Salolainen, Pertti  KOK 8 621 23 645 ■ 68 538 ■ ■ KOK-4 ■ 
8. Sinnemäki, Anni  VIHR 7 694 31 720 ■ 46 886 ■ ■ VIHR-2 ■ 
9. Kiviniemi, Mari  KESK 7 385 21 703 ■ 64 043 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
10. Arhinmäki, Paavo  VAS 6 859 21 366 ■ 40 716 ■ ■ VAS-1 ■ 
11. Haatainen, Tuula  SDP 6 686 22 374 ■ 31 273 ■ ■ SDP-3 ■ 
12. Asko-Seljavaara, Sirpa  KOK 6 293 18 916 ■ 30 842 ■ ■ KOK-5 ■ 
13. Hiltunen, Rakel  SDP 6 205 16 781 ■ 28 295 ■ ■ SDP-4 ■ 
14. Thors, Astrid  RKP 5 938 18 894 ■ 21 087 ■ ■ RKP-1 ■ 
15. Perkiö, Sanna  KOK 5 639 15 764 ■ 23 725 ■ ■ KOK-6 ■ 
16. Haavisto, Pekka  VIHR 5 418 21 147 ■ 29 304 ■ ■ VIHR-3 ■ 
17. Sumuvuori, Johanna  VIHR 5 173 15 860 ■ 23 443 ■ ■ VIHR-4 ■ 
18. Alanko-Kahiluoto, Outi  VIHR 4 622 12 688 ■ 19 536 ■ ■ VIHR-5 ■ 
19. Relander, Jukka  VIHR 4 403 10 573  18 033 ■ ■   
20. Hakola, Juha  KOK 4 258 13 512 ■ 15 816 ■  KOK-7 ■ 
21. Lipponen, Päivi  SDP 4 202 13 424 ■ 11 004   SDP-5 ■ 
22. Abdulla, Zahra  VIHR 4 198 9 063  16 745 – ■   
23. Karhuvaara, Arja  KOK 4 069 11 823 ■ 14 019     
24. Krohn, Minerva  VIHR 3 938 7 930  14 652     
25. Puoskari, Mari  VIHR 3 934 7 049  13 790     
26. Söderman, Jacob  SDP 3 902 11 187  10 424     
27. Puhakka, Sirpa  VAS 3 866 10 683  15 269 ■ ■   
28. Bryggare, Arto  SDP 3 857 9 589  10 071     
29. Valtonen, Olli  KOK 3 826 10 509  12 095     
30. Suomalainen, Nina  KOK 3 579 9 458  11 423     
31. Taipale, Ilkka  SDP 3 525 8 390  9 284     
32. Vanhanen, Merja  KESK 3 274 10 852  8 427     
…           
36. Pohtamo-Hietanen, Anne  KD 2 582 8 796  12 254     
…           
43. Halla-aho, Jussi  PS 2 215 9 415  16 037 –  PS-1 ■ 
…           
48. Lampela, Seppo (Steen 1)  SKP 1 842 4 495  18 277 ■ ■   
 
 
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with d’Hondt. 
3 ■ Elected with district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt. 
– Disqualified due to correction of underrepresentation. 
■ Disqualified due to legal threshold. 
4 ■ Elected with direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt. 
■ Disqualified due to legal threshold. 
5 ■ Elected with Hare-Niemayer. 
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Häme 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Koskinen, Johannes SDP 9 056 52 902 ■ 59 419 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
2. Räsänen, Päivi KD 8 053 14 576 ■ 134 790 ■ ■ KD-1 ■ 
3. Koskinen, Jari KOK 7 309 46 708 ■ 51 403 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
4. Anttila, Sirkka-Liisa KESK 6 880 38 383 ■ 37 672 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
5. Taiveaho, Satu SDP 6 760 26 451 ■ 34 953 ■ ■ SDP-2 ■ 
6. Nurmi, Tuija KOK 6 749 23 354 ■ 41 123 ■ ■ KOK-2 ■ 
7. Viljanen, Ilkka KOK 6 303 15 569 ■ 32 465 ■ ■ KOK-3 ■ 
8. Filatov, Tarja SDP 5 696 17 634 ■ 22 007 ■ ■ SDP-3 ■ 
9. Skinnari, Jouko SDP 5 565 13 226 ■ 21 221 ■ ■ SDP-4 ■ 
10. Salmi, Kari SDP 5 105 10 580  15 637 ■ ■   
11. Autio, Risto KESK 4 998 19 192 ■ 12 557 –  KESK-2 ■ 
12. Lintonen, Minna SDP 4 560 8 817  11 651     
13. Rehula, Juha KESK 4 549 12 794 ■ 11 042   KESK-3 ■ 
14. Heinonen, Timo KOK 4 524 11 677 ■ 18 142 ■ ■ KOK-4 ■ 
15. Jokinen, Kalle KOK 4 283 9 342  16 233 ■ ■   
16. Penttilä, Mika KESK 4 150 9 596  10 166     
17. Kiemunki, Iisakki SDP 3 594 7 557  9 584     
18. Taponen, Merja KESK 3 551 7 677  9 020     
19. Kauppila, Matti VAS 3 468 15 745 ■ 12 858 ■ ■ VAS-1 ■ 
20. Lindqvist, Maija-Liisa KESK 3 439 6 397  8 654     
21. Ojansuu, Kirsi VIHR 3 405 11 628 ■ 12 338 ■ ■ VIHR-1 ■ 
22. Rautio, Sari KOK 3 325 7 785  10 455     
 
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with d’Hondt. 
3 ■ Elected with district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt. 
– Disqualified due to correction of underrepresentation. 
4 ■ Elected with direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt. 
5 ■ Elected with Hare-Niemayer. 
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Keski-Suomi 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Pekkarinen, Mauri KESK 9 102 47 058 ■ 128 086 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
2. Huovinen, Susanna SDP 8 365 34 710 ■ 54 018 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
3. Kalmari, Anne KESK 8 266 23 529 ■ 91 490 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
4. Virkkunen, Henna KOK 6 133 21 008 ■ 26 819 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
5. Paloniemi, Aila KESK 5 461 15 686 ■ 16 421 ■ ■ KESK-3 ■ 
6. Peltonen, Tuula SDP 5 382 17 355 ■ 18 569 ■ ■ SDP-2 ■ 
7. Kankaanniemi, Toimi KD 5 116 11 142 ■ 26 958 ■ ■ KD-1 ■ 
8. Laitinen, Reijo SDP 5 111 11 570 ■ 16 505 ■ ■ SDP-3 ■ 
9. Oinonen, Lauri KESK 4 621 11 765 ■ 11 436 ■ ■   
10. Kangas, Matti VAS 4 539 10 561 ■ 18 792 ■ ■ VAS-1 ■ 
11. Olin, Kalevi SDP 3 562 8 678  9 432     
12. Sorri, Katja KESK 3 076 9 412  7 907     
13. Vielma, Ahti KOK 2 969 10 504  9 207     
14. Mäkinen, Tuija VIHR 2 746 9 859  10 656   VIHR-1 ■ 
15. Suomala, Antti KESK 2 653 7 843  7 116     
 
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with d’Hondt. 
3 ■ Elected with district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt. 
4 ■ Elected with direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt. 
5 ■ Elected with Hare-Niemayer. 
 
 
Kymi 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Kiljunen, Anneli SDP 10 770 46 556 ■ 84 885 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
2. Häkämies, Jyri KOK 7 857 39 192 ■ 56 076 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
3. Tiusanen, Pentti VAS 6 801 11 727 ■ 34 899 ■ ■ VAS-1 ■ 
4. Larikka, Jari KOK 6 785 19 596 ■ 44 060 ■ ■ KOK-2 ■ 
5. Tiilikainen, Kimmo KESK 6 632 39 698 ■ 33 707 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
6. Paatero, Sirpa SDP 6 176 23 278 ■ 27 009 ■ ■ SDP-2 ■ 
7. Laukkanen, Markku KESK 5 328 19 849 ■ 14 894 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
8. Pakkanen, Markku KESK 5 063 13 233 ■ 13 342 ■  KESK-3 ■ 
9. Koski, Valto SDP 4 922 15 519 ■ 14 147 ■ ■ SDP-3 ■ 
10. Hurskainen, Sinikka SDP 4 866 11 639 ■ 13 818 ■ ■   
11. Paajanen, Reijo KOK 4 486 13 064 ■ 17 624 ■ ■ KOK-3 ■ 
12. Lahtela, Seppo KOK 4 371 9 798  16 671 ■ ■   
13. Kuosmanen, Pekka KOK 3 942 7 838  13 124  ■   
14. Torniainen, Ari KESK 3 903 9 925  9 559     
…           
19. Palm, Sari KD 1 749 11 012 ■ 8 424   KD-1 ■ 
…           
22. Purho, Hannu PS 1 439 8 899  9 355   PS-1 ■ 
 
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with d’Hondt. 
3 ■ Elected with district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt. 
4 ■ Elected with direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt. 
5 ■ Elected with Hare-Niemayer. 
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Lappi 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Väyrynen, Paavo KESK 10 944 42 712 ■ 160 107 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
2. Tennilä, Esko-Juhani VAS 7 739 22 353 ■ 81 432 ■ ■ VAS-1 ■ 
3. Mustajärvi, Markus VAS 7 675 11 177 ■ 61 074 ■ ■ VAS-2 ■ 
4. Ojala-Niemelä, Johanna SDP 6 252 14 595 ■ 29 710 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
5. Manninen, Hannes KESK 5 548 21 356 ■ 17 309 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
6. Seurujärvi, Janne KESK 5 341 14 237 ■ 15 248   KESK-3 ■ 
7. Rask, Maija SDP 5 106 7 298  16 059 ■ ■   
8. Rundgren, Simo KESK 4 967 10 678  12 316     
9. Karvo, Ulla KOK 4 634 14 629 ■ 19 898 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
10. Karvonen, Tatja KESK 4 022 8 542  9 853     
11. Ruotsalainen, Ari KESK 3 476 7 119  8 773     
12. Törmänen, Timo VIHR 3 065 7 315  11 721     
13. Autto, Heikki KOK 2 450 4 876  7 808     
14. Nivala, Heikki KESK 2 328 6 102  6 341     
15. Viitala, Susanna KESK 1 935 5 339  6 042     
 
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with d’Hondt. 
3 ■ Elected with district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt. 
4 ■ Elected with direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt. 
5 ■ Elected with Hare-Niemayer. 
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Oulu 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Lehtomäki, Paula KESK 16 390 98 813 ■ 320 214 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
2. Tölli, Tapani KESK 8 458 49 407 ■ 106 738 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
3. Korhonen, Martti VAS 8 234 36 987 ■ 122 148 ■ ■ VAS-1 ■ 
4. Kyllönen, Merja VAS 7 019 18 494 ■ 48 859 ■ ■ VAS-2 ■ 
5. Vehkaperä, Mirja KESK 6 933 32 938 ■ 40 027 ■ ■ KESK-3 ■ 
6. Kerola, Inkeri KESK 6 431 24 703 ■ 32 021 ■ ■ KESK-4 ■ 
7. Karjula, Kyösti KESK 6 016 19 763 ■ 26 685 ■ ■ KESK-5 ■ 
8. Rantakangas, Antti KESK 5 933 16 469 ■ 23 720 ■ ■ KESK-6 ■ 
9. Hänninen, Tuomo KESK 5 851 14 116 ■ 22 084 ■ ■ KESK-7 ■ 
10. Korhonen, Timo KESK 5 597 12 352 ■ 17 790 ■ ■ KESK-8 ■ 
11. Vilkuna, Pekka KESK 5 450 10 979 ■ 16 011 ■ ■   
12. Moilanen-Savolainen, Riikka KESK 5 381 9 881  15 620 ■ ■   
13. Valpas, Unto VAS 5 299 12 329 ■ 24 430 ■ ■ VAS-3 ■ 
14. Jaakonsaari, Liisa SDP 5 003 29 295 ■ 14 493 –  SDP-1 ■ 
15. Harju, Pauli KESK 4 846 8 983  11 860     
16. Ahde, Matti SDP 4 783 14 648 ■ 13 204   SDP-2 ■ 
17. Kalliorinne, Risto VAS 4 565 9 247  20 358 ■ ■   
18. Lindén, Suvi KOK 4 131 31 987 ■ 15 045 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
19. Ukkola, Tuulikki KOK 4 069 15 994 ■ 14 345  ■ KOK-2 ■ 
20. Rajala, Lyly KOK 4 019 10 662 ■ 13 708     
21. Koski, Markku KESK 3 960 8 234  9 703     
22. Pulliainen, Erkki VIHR 3 945 14 102 ■ 15 629 ■ ■ VIHR-1 ■ 
23. Rinta-Jouppi, Meeri KESK 3 795 7 601  9 282     
24. Haapanen, Satu VIHR 3 535 7 051  13 024 ■    
25. Oikarinen, Kyösti KESK 3 533 7 058  8 895     
26. Piirainen, Raimo SDP 3 468 9 765  9 141     
27. Kemppainen, Marja-Leena KD 3 434 7 713  16 849 ■ ■ KD-1 ■ 
28. Kippola, Eero SDP 3 379 7 324  9 003     
…           
45. Kettunen, Pentti PS 1 276 9 281  8 635   PS-1 ■ 
 
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with d’Hondt. 
3 ■ Elected with district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt. 
– Disqualified due to correction of underrepresentation. 
4 ■ Elected with direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt. 
5 ■ Elected with Hare-Niemayer. 
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Pirkanmaa 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Tiura, Marja KOK 17 578 63 399 ■ 205 614 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
2. Karhu, Saara SDP 11 477 60 160 ■ 198 065 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
3. Viitanen, Pia SDP 9 752 30 080 ■ 74 274 ■ ■ SDP-2 ■ 
4. Tynkkynen, Oras VIHR 7 930 22 056 ■ 78 143 ■ ■ VIHR-1 ■ 
5. Gustafsson, Jukka SDP 7 057 20 053 ■ 37 137 ■ ■ SDP-3 ■ 
6. Satonen, Arto KOK 6 678 31 700 ■ 38 553 ■ ■ KOK-2 ■ 
7. Sasi, Kimmo KOK 6 505 21 133 ■ 36 285 ■ ■ KOK-3 ■ 
8. Salovaara, Pertti KESK 6 350 41 126 ■ 30 497 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
9. Koskela, Laila SSP 5 761 7 812  16 715 ■ ■   
10. Alatalo, Mikko KESK 5 646 20 563 ■ 18 836 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
11. Kuoppa, Mikko VAS 5 324 24 304 ■ 27 144 ■ ■ VAS-1 ■ 
12. Sirnö, Minna VAS 5 093 12 152 ■ 22 209 ■ ■ VAS-2 ■ 
13. Jaskari, Harri KOK 4 812 15 850 ■ 21 270 ■ ■ KOK-4 ■ 
14. Rönni, Tero SDP 4 665 15 040 ■ 12 126 ■  SDP-4 ■ 
15. Asell, Marko SDP 4 590 12 032 ■ 11 884 –    
16. Pentti, Klaus KESK 4 565 13 709 ■ 11 236  ■ KESK-3 ■ 
17. Pirttilahti, Arto KESK 4 300 10 282  10 674     
18. Rauhala, Leena KD 4 197 15 681 ■ 19 256 ■ ■ KD-1 ■ 
19. Virtanen, Pertti ”Veltto” PS 4 124 12 683 ■ 22 451 ■ ■ PS-1 ■ 
20. Lamminmäki, Ari KESK 3 891 8 225  9 418     
21. Ollila, Heikki A. KOK 3 869 12 680 ■ 12 337 ■ ■ KOK-5 ■ 
22. Lepistö, Joonas SDP 3 770 10 027  9 741     
23. Telemäki, Satu KOK 3 369 10 567  10 822     
24. Koskinen, Riitta KOK 3 309 9 057  10 281     
25. Mäkipää, Lea PS 3 250 6 342  18 709 ■ ■   
…           
29. Aarnio, Ulriikka VIHR 2 782 11 028  11 163 ■ ■ VIHR-2 ■ 
30. Heikkilä, Jari VAS 2 518 6 076  8 725     
 
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with d’Hondt. 
3 ■ Elected with district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt. 
– Disqualified due to correction of underrepresentation. 
■ Disqualified due to legal threshold. 
4 ■ Elected with direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt. 
■ Disqualified due to legal threshold. 
5 ■ Elected with Hare-Niemayer. 
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Pohjois-Karjala 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Lahtela, Esa SDP 10 813 29 105 ■ 99 032 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
2. Cronberg, Tarja VIHR 7 804 9 955  58 607 ■ ■ VIHR-1 ■ 
3. Vehviläinen, Anu KESK 6 789 30 391 ■ 35 579 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
4. Hoskonen, Hannu KESK 5 982 15 196 ■ 25 617 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
5. Reijonen, Eero KESK 5 021 10 130 ■ 12 809     
6. Ravi, Pekka KOK 4 589 15 043 ■ 18 692 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
7. Kämäräinen, Matti KESK 4 534 7 598  10 855     
8. Kähkönen, Lauri SDP 4 391 14 553 ■ 11 211   SDP-2 ■ 
9. Tahvanainen, Säde SDP 3 359 9 702  8 869     
…           
14. Leppänen, Urpo PS 1 975 3 761  14 032 ■ ■   
 
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with d’Hondt. 
3 ■ Elected with district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt. 
4 ■ Elected with direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt. 
5 ■ Elected with Hare-Niemayer. 
 
 
Pohjois-Savo 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Katainen, Jyrki KOK 10 806 26 030 ■ 123 368 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
2. Rajamäki, Kari SDP 7 850 24 760 ■ 49 516 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
3. Kääriäinen, Seppo KESK 7 629 45 607 ■ 71 159 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
4. Heikkinen, Hannakaisa KESK 7 083 22 804 ■ 42 695 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
5. Kärkkäinen, Kari KD 5 778 10 316 ■ 33 698 ■ ■ KD-1 ■ 
6. Katainen, Elsi KESK 5 683 15 202 ■ 19 407 ■ ■ KESK-3 ■ 
7. Väätäinen, Tuula SDP 5 018 12 380 ■ 14 855 ■ ■ SDP-2 ■ 
8. Oinonen, Pentti Juhani PS 4 334 13 015 ■ 28 064 ■ ■   
9. Rossi, Markku KESK 4 233 11 402 ■ 10 329 ■  KESK-4 ■ 
10. Kettunen, Rauno KESK 4 093 9 121  10 007     
11. Virtanen, Erkki VAS 3 808 19 326 ■ 14 370 ■ ■ VAS-1 ■ 
12. Martikainen, Ossi KESK 3 565 7 601  9 149     
13. Lämsä, Eero KESK 3 226 6 515  8 317     
14. Pakarinen, Riikka KESK 3 186 5 701  8 211     
15. Semi, Matti VAS 2 958 9 663  9 772     
16. Eestilä, Markku KOK 2 648 8 677  8 225  ■ KOK-2 ■ 
17. Haring, Kari VAS 2 599 6 442  9 048     
 
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with d’Hondt. 
3 ■ Elected with district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt. 
4 ■ Elected with direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt. 
5 ■ Elected with Hare-Niemayer. 
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Satakunta 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Kataja, Sampsa KOK 8 463 26 395 ■ 61 684 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
2. Kalli, Timo KESK 5 836 30 377 ■ 21 348 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
3. Kaltiokumpu, Oiva KESK 5 611 15 189 ■ 18 298 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
4. Kiuru, Krista SDP 5 560 36 232 ■ 20 489 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
5. Kallio, Reijo SDP 5 400 18 116 ■ 19 168 ■ ■ SDP-2 ■ 
6. Korkeaoja, Juha KESK 5 316 10 126 ■ 14 555 ■ ■   
7. Vuolanne, Antti SDP 5 182 12 077 ■ 17 476 ■ ■ SDP-3 ■ 
8. Juhantalo, Kauko KESK 5 054 7 594  13 070 –    
9. Joutsenlahti, Anssi PS 4 912 9 579  37 419 ■ ■ PS-1 ■ 
10. Eskanen, Heli SDP 4 416 9 058  11 427     
11. Holmlund, Anne KOK 3 896 13 198 ■ 12 589   KOK-2 ■ 
12. Lehtonen, Harri SDP 3 332 7 246  8 738     
13. Puhjo, Veijo VAS 3 271 14 815 ■ 12 215 ■ ■ VAS-1 ■ 
14. Salonen, Kristiina SDP 3 152 6 039  8 369     
 
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with d’Hondt. 
3 ■ Elected with district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt. 
– Disqualified due to correction of underrepresentation. 
4 ■ Elected with direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt. 
5 ■ Elected with Hare-Niemayer. 
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Uusimaa 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Niinistö, Sauli KOK 60 563 133 885 ■ 616 841 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
2. Vanhanen, Matti KESK 24 112 57 609 ■ 640 428 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
3. Soini, Timo PS 19 859 28 593 ■ 112 256 ■ ■ PS-1 ■ 
4. Hautala, Heidi VIHR 12 924 50 718 ■ 234 429 ■ ■ VIHR-1 ■ 
5. Guzenina-Richardson, Maria SDP 12 578 94 215 ■ 297 097 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
6. Andersson, Claes VAS 9 390 31 324 ■ 244 296 ■ ■ VAS-1 ■ 
7. Kalliomäki, Antti SDP 9 234 47 108 ■ 66 022 ■ ■ SDP-2 ■ 
8. Blomqvist, Thomas RKP 7 280 44 418 ■ 42 173 ■ ■ RKP-1 ■ 
9. Gestrin, Christina RKP 6 402 22 209 ■ 25 304 ■ ■ RKP-2 ■ 
10. Matikainen-Kallström, Marjo KOK 6 249 66 943 ■ 29 373 ■ ■ KOK-2 ■ 
11. Feldt-Ranta, Maarit SDP 5 949 31 405 ■ 23 768 ■ ■ SDP-3 ■ 
12. Kiljunen, Kimmo SDP 5 940 23 554 ■ 22 854 ■ ■ SDP-4 ■ 
13. Mäkelä, Outi KOK 5 808 44 628 ■ 24 674 ■ ■ KOK-3 ■ 
14. Saarela, Tanja KESK 5 712 28 805 ■ 20 013 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
15. Saarinen, Matti SDP 5 430 18 843 ■ 19 806 ■ ■ SDP-5 ■ 
16. Vahasalo, Raija KOK 5 296 33 471 ■ 22 846 ■ ■ KOK-4 ■ 
17. Kuusisto, Merja SDP 5 130 15 703 ■ 16 977 ■ ■ SDP-6 ■ 
18. Kasvi, Jyrki VIHR 4 880 25 359 ■ 21 312 ■ ■ VIHR-2 ■ 
19. Nylander, Mikaela RKP 4 825 14 806 ■ 15 815 ■ ■ RKP-3 ■ 
20. Tabermann, Tommy SDP 4 814 13 459 ■ 13 504 ■ ■ SDP-7 ■ 
21. Kuisma, Risto SDP 4 765 11 777  12 917 ■ ■   
22. Mäkinen, Tapani KOK 4 450 26 777 ■ 17 134 ■ ■ KOK-5 ■ 
23. Liljeström, Christel RKP 4 403 11 105  10 543 ■ ■   
24. Tallqvist, Tarja KD 4 391 19 157 ■ 22 465 ■ ■ KD-1 ■ 
25. Kaikkonen, Antti KESK 4 263 19 203 ■ 10 499 – ■ KESK-3 ■ 
26. Hemming, Hanna-Leena KOK 4 203 22 314 ■ 15 421 ■ ■ KOK-6 ■ 
27. Harkimo, Leena KOK 4 074 19 126 ■ 14 687 ■ ■ KOK-7 ■ 
28. Akaan-Penttilä, Eero KOK 3 985 16 736 ■ 13 410 ■ ■ KOK-8 ■ 
29. Rahkonen, Susanna SDP 3 895 10 468  10 245  ■   
30. Mäkelä, Jukka KOK 3 564 14 876 ■ 11 215 ■ ■ KOK-9 ■ 
31. Lauslahti, Sanna KOK 3 544 13 389 ■ 11 015 ■  KOK-10 ■ 
32. Johansson, Ulf RKP 3 474 8 884  9 037 ■    
33. Lehti, Eero KOK 3 215 12 171 ■ 9 949     
34. Laakso, Jaakko VAS 3 074 15 662 ■ 11 104 ■ ■ VAS-2 ■ 
35. Uotila, Kari VAS 2 975 10 441  10 622 –    
36. Tani, Sari SDP 2 863 9 422  8 140     
37. Uusipaavalniemi, Markku KESK 2 817 14 402 ■ 7 447   KESK-4 ■ 
…           
41. Laukkanen, Antero KD 2 681 9 579  13 479 ■ ■ KD-2 ■ 
42. Jalonen, Jaakko SDP 2 667 7 851  7 521     
43. Karimäki, Johanna VIHR 2 659 16 906 ■ 10 193   VIHR-3 ■ 
44. Salo, Salla VAS 2 603 7 831  9 396     
45. Forsius, Merikukka VIHR 2 479 12 680 ■ 9 768   VIHR-4 ■ 
46. Luhtanen, Leena SDP 2 444 7 247  6 909     
47. Kokko, Annika KD 2 435 6 386  10 368 ■ ■   
…           
93. Ruohonen-Lerner, Pirkko PS 1 058 14 297 ■ 7 016 ■ ■ PS-2 ■ 
    
1 – District magnitude. 4 ■ Elected with direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt. 
2 ■ Elected with d’Hondt. 5 ■ Elected with Hare-Niemayer. 
3 ■ Elected with district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt. 
– Disqualified due to correction of underrepresentation. 
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Vaasa 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Mieto, Juha KESK 13 768 78 523 ■ 213 476 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
2. Risikko, Paula KOK 9 265 34 101 ■ 102 807 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
3. Wideroos, Ulla-Maj RKP 9 141 49 839 ■ 63 260 ■ ■ RKP-1 ■ 
4. Vistbacka, Raimo PS 8 046 15 646 ■ 56 128 ■ ■ PS-1 ■ 
5. Kallis, Bjarne KD 7 821 16 919 ■ 67 395 ■ ■ KD-1 ■ 
6. Lintilä, Mika KESK 7 697 39 262 ■ 80 054 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
7. Puumala, Tuomo KESK 7 335 26 174 ■ 58 221 ■ ■ KESK-3 ■ 
8. Sihto, Paula KESK 7 313 19 631 ■ 53 369 ■ ■ KESK-4 ■ 
9. Kumpula-Natri, Miapetra SDP 7 285 30 720 ■ 42 442 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
10. Haapoja, Susanna KESK 7 263 15 705 ■ 49 264 ■ ■ KESK-5 ■ 
11. Urpilainen, Jutta SDP 7 244 15 360 ■ 39 613 ■ ■ SDP-2 ■ 
12. Nylund, Mats RKP 7 084 24 920 ■ 31 630 ■ ■ RKP-2 ■ 
13. Salo, Petri KOK 6 344 17 051 ■ 34 269 ■ ■ KOK-2 ■ 
14. Wallin, Harry SDP 6 027 10 240  25 835 ■ ■   
15. Ahonen, Esko KESK 5 974 13 087 ■ 24 632 ■ ■ KESK-6 ■ 
16. Hautala, Lasse KESK 5 509 11 218  16 853 ■ ■   
17. Nordman, Håkan RKP 5 430 16 613 ■ 18 074 ■ ■ RKP-3 ■ 
18. Savola, Mikko KESK 5 281 9 815  14 232     
19. Vihriälä, Jukka KESK 5 153 8 725  13 626     
20. Ranta-Muotio, Aulis KESK 4 824 7 852  11 644     
21. Henriksson, Anna-Maja RKP 4 600 12 460 ■ 14 058   RKP-4 ■ 
22. Nygård-Fagerudd, Wivan RKP 4 484 9 968  12 652     
23. Gästgivars, Lars RKP 4 455 8 307  11 502     
24. Löv, Pehr RKP 3 928 7 120  9 732     
25. Moisio, Harri VAS 3 636 11 342  13 572   VAS-1 ■ 
26. Luther, Michael RKP 3 200 6 230  8 435     
27. Pihlajaniemi, Petri KOK 3 091 11 367 ■ 9 791     
28. Sankelo, Janne KOK 3 082 8 525  9 490     
29. Snellman, Gerhard KD 2 847 8 460  14 977     
30. Sjölund, Richard SDP 2 492 7 680  7 074     
 
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with d’Hondt. 
3 ■ Elected with district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt. 
4 ■ Elected with direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt. 
5 ■ Elected with Hare-Niemayer. 
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Varsinais-Suomi 
1 Candidate Party Votes 
Distribution 
figure, district 2 
Distribution 
figure, region 3 4 Quota 5 
1. Wallin, Stefan RKP 12 097 51 979 ■ 126 520 ■ ■ RKP-1 ■ 
2. Paasio, Heli SDP 11 233 53 281 ■ 148 549 ■ ■ SDP-1 ■ 
3. Kanerva, Ilkka KOK 11 079 66 793 ■ 154 210 ■ ■ KOK-1 ■ 
4. Essayah, Sari KD 7 734 11 377  44 930 ■ ■ KD-1 ■ 
5. Koskinen, Marjaana SDP 7 649 26 641 ■ 45 707 ■ ■ SDP-2 ■ 
6. Kaunisto, Timo KESK 7 213 25 990 ■ 45 745 ■ ■ KESK-1 ■ 
7. Virolainen, Anne-Mari KOK 6 812 33 397 ■ 47 449 ■ ■ KOK-2 ■ 
8. Kiviranta, Esko KESK 6 210 17 326 ■ 29 110 ■ ■ KESK-2 ■ 
9. Hemmilä, Pertti KOK 6 188 22 264 ■ 28 038 ■ ■ KOK-3 ■ 
10. Hyssälä, Liisa KESK 6 152 12 995 ■ 27 845 ■ ■ KESK-3 ■ 
11. Orpo, Petteri KOK 6 069 16 698 ■ 25 702 ■ ■ KOK-4 ■ 
12. Taimela, Katja SDP 5 984 17 760 ■ 24 758 ■ ■ SDP-3 ■ 
13. Andersson, Janina VIHR 5 587 22 868 ■ 39 072 ■ ■ VIHR-1 ■ 
14. Lapintie, Annika VAS 5 575 25 937 ■ 30 537 ■ ■ VAS-1 ■ 
15. Niinistö, Ville VIHR 5 182 11 434 ■ 26 048 ■ ■   
16. Kantola, Ilkka SDP 5 091 13 320 ■ 15 236   SDP-4 ■ 
17. Laxell, Jouko KOK 5 056 13 359 ■ 22 030 ■ ■ KOK-5 ■ 
18. Salo, Mauri KESK 4 877 10 396  12 084     
19. Puisto, Virpa SDP 4 743 10 656  12 642     
20. Lehtinen, Seppo SDP 4 716 8 880  12 379     
21. Huovinen, Pentti KOK 4 700 11 132  20 561 ■ ■   
22. Perho, Maija KOK 4 602 9 542  19 276     
23. Yrttiaho, Jyrki VAS 4 492 12 969 ■ 17 450   VAS-2 ■ 
24. Immonen, Mikko VAS 4 113 8 646  16 286     
25. Helminen, Sari SDP 3 962 7 612  10 804     
 
1 – District magnitude. 
2 ■ Elected with d’Hondt. 
3 ■ Elected with district-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt. 
4 ■ Elected with direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt. 
5 ■ Elected with Hare-Niemayer. 
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Appendix B. Party vote and seat shares by district103 
Etelä-Savo 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 30 759 37,4 2 33,3 
SDP 22 704 27,6 1 16,7 
KOK 15 530 18,9 2 33,3 
VIHR 5 714 6,9 1 16,7 
KD 2 925 3,6 0 0,0 
PS 2 653 3,2 0 0,0 
VAS 1 419 1,7 0 0,0 
SKP 307 0,4 0 0,0 
ITSP 149 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 40 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 35 0,0 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 30 759 37,4 2 33,3 
SDP 22 704 27,6 2 33,3 
KOK 15 530 18,9 0 0,0 
VIHR 5 714 6,9 1 16,7 
KD 2 925 3,6 0 0,0 
PS 2 653 3,2 1 16,7 
VAS 1 419 1,7 0 0,0 
SKP 307 0,4 0 0,0 
ITSP 149 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 40 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 35 0,0 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 30 759 37,4 2 33,3 
SDP 22 704 27,6 2 33,3 
KOK 15 530 18,9 1 16,7 
VIHR 5 714 6,9 1 16,7 
KD 2 925 3,6 0 0,0 
PS 2 653 3,2 0 0,0 
VAS 1 419 1,7 0 0,0 
SKP 307 0,4 0 0,0 
ITSP 149 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 40 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 35 0,0 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 30 759 37,4 2 33,3 
SDP 22 704 27,6 2 33,3 
KOK 15 530 18,9 1 16,7 
VIHR 5 714 6,9 1 16,7 
KD 2 925 3,6 0 0,0 
PS 2 653 3,2 0 0,0 
VAS 1 419 1,7 0 0,0 
SKP 307 0,4 0 0,0 
ITSP 149 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 40 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 35 0,0 0 0,0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
103 All tables modified from originals produced by Yle (Yle 2007b). 
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Helsinki 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 94 581 30,0 8 38,1 
SDP 67 122 21,3 5 23,8 
VIHR 63 440 20,1 5 23,8 
KESK 21 703 6,9 1 4,8 
VAS 21 366 6,8 1 4,8 
RKP 18 894 6,0 1 4,8 
PS 9 188 2,9 0 0,0 
KD 7 903 2,5 0 0,0 
SKP 4 495 1,4 0 0,0 
SSP 2 355 0,7 0 0,0 
LIB 1 416 0,4 0 0,0 
KÖY 893 0,3 0 0,0 
STP 687 0,2 0 0,0 
MUUT 280 0,1 0 0,0 
ITSP 227 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 224 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 150 0,0 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 94 581 30,0 7 33,3 
SDP 67 122 21,3 4 19,0 
VIHR 63 440 20,1 6 28,6 
KESK 21 703 6,9 1 4,8 
VAS 21 366 6,8 2 9,5 
RKP 18 894 6,0 1 4,8 
PS 9 188 2,9 0 0,0 
KD 7 903 2,5 0 0,0 
SKP 4 495 1,4 0 0,0 
SSP 2 355 0,7 0 0,0 
LIB 1 416 0,4 0 0,0 
KÖY 893 0,3 0 0,0 
STP 687 0,2 0 0,0 
MUUT 280 0,1 0 0,0 
ITSP 227 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 224 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 150 0,0 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 94 581 30,0 6 28,6 
SDP 67 122 21,3 4 19,0 
VIHR 63 440 20,1 7 33,3 
KESK 21 703 6,9 1 4,8 
VAS 21 366 6,8 2 9,5 
RKP 18 894 6,0 1 4,8 
PS 9 188 2,9 0 0,0 
KD 7 903 2,5 0 0,0 
SKP 4 495 1,4 0 0,0 
SSP 2 355 0,7 0 0,0 
LIB 1 416 0,4 0 0,0 
KÖY 893 0,3 0 0,0 
STP 687 0,2 0 0,0 
MUUT 280 0,1 0 0,0 
ITSP 227 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 224 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 150 0,0 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 94 581 30,0 7 33,3 
SDP 67 122 21,3 5 23,8 
VIHR 63 440 20,1 5 23,8 
KESK 21 703 6,9 1 4,8 
VAS 21 366 6,8 1 4,8 
RKP 18 894 6,0 1 4,8 
PS 9 188 2,9 1 4,8 
KD 7 903 2,5 0 0,0 
SKP 4 495 1,4 0 0,0 
SSP 2 355 0,7 0 0,0 
LIB 1 416 0,4 0 0,0 
KÖY 893 0,3 0 0,0 
STP 687 0,2 0 0,0 
MUUT 280 0,1 0 0,0 
ITSP 227 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 224 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 150 0,0 0 0,0 
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Häme 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
SDP 52 902 28,0 4 28,6 
KOK 46 708 24,7 4 28,6 
KESK 38 383 20,3 3 21,4 
VAS 15 745 8,3 1 7,1 
KD 14 576 7,7 1 7,1 
VIHR 11 628 6,1 1 7,1 
PS 4 182 2,2 0 0,0 
SSP 2 723 1,4 0 0,0 
SKP 1 185 0,6 0 0,0 
ITSP 215 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 175 0,1 0 0,0 
LIB 174 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 153 0,1 0 0,0 
MUUT 145 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 124 0,1 0 0,0 
YVP 95 0,1 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
SDP 52 902 28,0 5 35,7 
KOK 46 708 24,7 5 35,7 
KESK 38 383 20,3 1 7,1 
VAS 15 745 8,3 1 7,1 
KD 14 576 7,7 1 7,1 
VIHR 11 628 6,1 1 7,1 
PS 4 182 2,2 0 0,0 
SSP 2 723 1,4 0 0,0 
SKP 1 185 0,6 0 0,0 
ITSP 215 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 175 0,1 0 0,0 
LIB 174 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 153 0,1 0 0,0 
MUUT 145 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 124 0,1 0 0,0 
YVP 95 0,1 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
SDP 52 902 28,0 5 35,7 
KOK 46 708 24,7 5 35,7 
KESK 38 383 20,3 1 7,1 
VAS 15 745 8,3 1 7,1 
KD 14 576 7,7 1 7,1 
VIHR 11 628 6,1 1 7,1 
PS 4 182 2,2 0 0,0 
SSP 2 723 1,4 0 0,0 
SKP 1 185 0,6 0 0,0 
ITSP 215 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 175 0,1 0 0,0 
LIB 174 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 153 0,1 0 0,0 
MUUT 145 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 124 0,1 0 0,0 
YVP 95 0,1 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
SDP 52 902 28,0 4 28,6 
KOK 46 708 24,7 4 28,6 
KESK 38 383 20,3 3 21,4 
VAS 15 745 8,3 1 7,1 
KD 14 576 7,7 1 7,1 
VIHR 11 628 6,1 1 7,1 
PS 4 182 2,2 0 0,0 
SSP 2 723 1,4 0 0,0 
SKP 1 185 0,6 0 0,0 
ITSP 215 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 175 0,1 0 0,0 
LIB 174 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 153 0,1 0 0,0 
MUUT 145 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 124 0,1 0 0,0 
YVP 95 0,1 0 0,0 
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Keski-Suomi 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 47 058 33,2 4 40,0 
SDP 34 710 24,5 3 30,0 
KOK 21 008 14,8 1 10,0 
KD 11 142 7,9 1 10,0 
VAS 10 561 7,4 1 10,0 
VIHR 9 859 7,0 0 0,0 
PS 3 616 2,6 0 0,0 
SKP 2 368 1,7 0 0,0 
SSP 913 0,6 0 0,0 
ITSP 284 0,2 0 0,0 
LIB 142 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 97 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 45 0,0 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 47 058 33,2 4 40,0 
SDP 34 710 24,5 3 30,0 
KOK 21 008 14,8 1 10,0 
KD 11 142 7,9 1 10,0 
VAS 10 561 7,4 1 10,0 
VIHR 9 859 7,0 0 0,0 
PS 3 616 2,6 0 0,0 
SKP 2 368 1,7 0 0,0 
SSP 913 0,6 0 0,0 
ITSP 284 0,2 0 0,0 
LIB 142 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 97 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 45 0,0 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 47 058 33,2 4 40,0 
SDP 34 710 24,5 3 30,0 
KOK 21 008 14,8 1 10,0 
KD 11 142 7,9 1 10,0 
VAS 10 561 7,4 1 10,0 
VIHR 9 859 7,0 0 0,0 
PS 3 616 2,6 0 0,0 
SKP 2 368 1,7 0 0,0 
SSP 913 0,6 0 0,0 
ITSP 284 0,2 0 0,0 
LIB 142 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 97 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 45 0,0 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 47 058 33,2 3 30,0 
SDP 34 710 24,5 3 30,0 
KOK 21 008 14,8 1 10,0 
KD 11 142 7,9 1 10,0 
VAS 10 561 7,4 1 10,0 
VIHR 9 859 7,0 1 10,0 
PS 3 616 2,6 0 0,0 
SKP 2 368 1,7 0 0,0 
SSP 913 0,6 0 0,0 
ITSP 284 0,2 0 0,0 
LIB 142 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 97 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 45 0,0 0 0,0 
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Kymi 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
SDP 46 556 28,0 4 33,3 
KESK 39 698 23,9 3 25,0 
KOK 39 192 23,6 3 25,0 
VAS 11 727 7,0 1 8,3 
KD 11 012 6,6 1 8,3 
PS 8 899 5,3 0 0,0 
VIHR 8 077 4,9 0 0,0 
SKP 532 0,3 0 0,0 
ITSP 372 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 96 0,1 0 0,0 
MUUT 83 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 72 0,0 0 0,0 
YVP 69 0,0 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
SDP 46 556 28,0 4 33,3 
KESK 39 698 23,9 3 25,0 
KOK 39 192 23,6 4 33,3 
VAS 11 727 7,0 1 8,3 
KD 11 012 6,6 0 0,0 
PS 8 899 5,3 0 0,0 
VIHR 8 077 4,9 0 0,0 
SKP 532 0,3 0 0,0 
ITSP 372 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 96 0,1 0 0,0 
MUUT 83 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 72 0,0 0 0,0 
YVP 69 0,0 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
SDP 46 556 28,0 4 33,3 
KESK 39 698 23,9 2 16,7 
KOK 39 192 23,6 5 41,7 
VAS 11 727 7,0 1 8,3 
KD 11 012 6,6 0 0,0 
PS 8 899 5,3 0 0,0 
VIHR 8 077 4,9 0 0,0 
SKP 532 0,3 0 0,0 
ITSP 372 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 96 0,1 0 0,0 
MUUT 83 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 72 0,0 0 0,0 
YVP 69 0,0 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
SDP 46 556 28,0 3 25,0 
KESK 39 698 23,9 3 25,0 
KOK 39 192 23,6 3 25,0 
VAS 11 727 7,0 1 8,3 
KD 11 012 6,6 1 8,3 
PS 8 899 5,3 1 8,3 
VIHR 8 077 4,9 0 0,0 
SKP 532 0,3 0 0,0 
ITSP 372 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 96 0,1 0 0,0 
MUUT 83 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 72 0,0 0 0,0 
YVP 69 0,0 0 0,0 
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Lappi 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 41 771 43,2 3 42,9 
VAS 22 353 23,1 2 28,6 
SDP 14 595 15,1 1 14,3 
KOK 11 525 11,9 1 14,3 
VIHR 3 104 3,2 0 0,0 
PS 1 732 1,8 0 0,0 
KD 941 1,0 0 0,0 
KTP 341 0,4 0 0,0 
SKP 216 0,2 0 0,0 
KÖY 149 0,2 0 0,0 
ITSP 50 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 18 0,0 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 41 771 43,2 2 28,6 
VAS 22 353 23,1 2 28,6 
SDP 14 595 15,1 2 28,6 
KOK 11 525 11,9 1 14,3 
VIHR 3 104 3,2 0 0,0 
PS 1 732 1,8 0 0,0 
KD 941 1,0 0 0,0 
KTP 341 0,4 0 0,0 
SKP 216 0,2 0 0,0 
KÖY 149 0,2 0 0,0 
ITSP 50 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 18 0,0 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 41 771 43,2 2 28,6 
VAS 22 353 23,1 2 28,6 
SDP 14 595 15,1 2 28,6 
KOK 11 525 11,9 1 14,3 
VIHR 3 104 3,2 0 0,0 
PS 1 732 1,8 0 0,0 
KD 941 1,0 0 0,0 
KTP 341 0,4 0 0,0 
SKP 216 0,2 0 0,0 
KÖY 149 0,2 0 0,0 
ITSP 50 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 18 0,0 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 41 771 43,2 3 42,9 
VAS 22 353 23,1 2 28,6 
SDP 14 595 15,1 1 14,3 
KOK 11 525 11,9 1 14,3 
VIHR 3 104 3,2 0 0,0 
PS 1 732 1,8 0 0,0 
KD 941 1,0 0 0,0 
KTP 341 0,4 0 0,0 
SKP 216 0,2 0 0,0 
KÖY 149 0,2 0 0,0 
ITSP 50 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 18 0,0 0 0,0 
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Oulu 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 98 813 43,1 9 50,0 
VAS 36 987 16,1 3 16,7 
KOK 31 987 14,0 3 16,7 
SDP 29 295 12,8 2 11,1 
VIHR 14 102 6,2 1 5,6 
PS 7 986 3,5 0 0,0 
KD 7 290 3,2 0 0,0 
ITSP 1 295 0,6 0 0,0 
SKP 545 0,2 0 0,0 
KÖY 423 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 186 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 134 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 87 0,0 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 98 813 43,1 10 55,6 
VAS 36 987 16,1 4 22,2 
KOK 31 987 14,0 1 5,6 
SDP 29 295 12,8 0 0,0 
VIHR 14 102 6,2 2 11,1 
PS 7 986 3,5 0 0,0 
KD 7 290 3,2 1 5,6 
ITSP 1 295 0,6 0 0,0 
SKP 545 0,2 0 0,0 
KÖY 423 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 186 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 134 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 87 0,0 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 98 813 43,1 10 55,6 
VAS 36 987 16,1 4 22,2 
KOK 31 987 14,0 2 11,1 
SDP 29 295 12,8 0 0,0 
VIHR 14 102 6,2 1 5,6 
PS 7 986 3,5 0 0,0 
KD 7 290 3,2 1 5,6 
ITSP 1 295 0,6 0 0,0 
SKP 545 0,2 0 0,0 
KÖY 423 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 186 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 134 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 87 0,0 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 98 813 43,1 8 44,4 
VAS 36 987 16,1 3 16,7 
KOK 31 987 14,0 2 11,1 
SDP 29 295 12,8 2 11,1 
VIHR 14 102 6,2 1 5,6 
PS 7 986 3,5 1 5,6 
KD 7 290 3,2 1 5,6 
ITSP 1 295 0,6 0 0,0 
SKP 545 0,2 0 0,0 
KÖY 423 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 186 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 134 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 87 0,0 0 0,0 
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Pirkanmaa 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 63 399 25,1 5 27,8 
SDP 60 160 23,8 5 27,8 
KESK 41 126 16,3 3 16,7 
VAS 24 304 9,6 2 11,1 
VIHR 22 056 8,7 1 5,6 
KD 15 681 6,2 1 5,6 
PS 12 378 4,9 1 5,6 
SSP 7 812 3,1 0 0,0 
SKP 3 805 1,5 0 0,0 
LIB 847 0,3 0 0,0 
ITSP 305 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 279 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 144 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 87 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 85 0,0 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 63 399 25,1 5 27,8 
SDP 60 160 23,8 4 22,2 
KESK 41 126 16,3 2 11,1 
VAS 24 304 9,6 2 11,1 
VIHR 22 056 8,7 2 11,1 
KD 15 681 6,2 1 5,6 
PS 12 378 4,9 2 11,1 
SSP 7 812 3,1 0 0,0 
SKP 3 805 1,5 0 0,0 
LIB 847 0,3 0 0,0 
ITSP 305 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 279 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 144 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 87 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 85 0,0 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 63 399 25,1 5 27,8 
SDP 60 160 23,8 3 16,7 
KESK 41 126 16,3 3 16,7 
VAS 24 304 9,6 2 11,1 
VIHR 22 056 8,7 2 11,1 
KD 15 681 6,2 1 5,6 
PS 12 378 4,9 2 11,1 
SSP 7 812 3,1 0 0,0 
SKP 3 805 1,5 0 0,0 
LIB 847 0,3 0 0,0 
ITSP 305 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 279 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 144 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 87 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 85 0,0 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 63 399 25,1 5 27,8 
SDP 60 160 23,8 4 22,2 
KESK 41 126 16,3 3 16,7 
VAS 24 304 9,6 2 11,1 
VIHR 22 056 8,7 2 11,1 
KD 15 681 6,2 1 5,6 
PS 12 378 4,9 1 5,6 
SSP 7 812 3,1 0 0,0 
SKP 3 805 1,5 0 0,0 
LIB 847 0,3 0 0,0 
ITSP 305 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 279 0,1 0 0,0 
SKS 144 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 87 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 85 0,0 0 0,0 
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Pohjois-Karjala 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 30 391 35,7 3 50,0 
SDP 26 942 31,6 2 33,3 
KOK 10 041 11,8 1 16,7 
VIHR 9 955 11,7 0 0,0 
KD 2 574 3,0 0 0,0 
PS 2 428 2,8 0 0,0 
VAS 2 163 2,5 0 0,0 
SKP 517 0,6 0 0,0 
ITSP 159 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 40 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 31 0,0 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 30 391 35,7 2 33,3 
SDP 26 942 31,6 1 16,7 
KOK 10 041 11,8 1 16,7 
VIHR 9 955 11,7 1 16,7 
KD 2 574 3,0 0 0,0 
PS 2 428 2,8 1 16,7 
VAS 2 163 2,5 0 0,0 
SKP 517 0,6 0 0,0 
ITSP 159 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 40 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 31 0,0 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 30 391 35,7 2 33,3 
SDP 26 942 31,6 1 16,7 
KOK 10 041 11,8 1 16,7 
VIHR 9 955 11,7 1 16,7 
KD 2 574 3,0 0 0,0 
PS 2 428 2,8 1 16,7 
VAS 2 163 2,5 0 0,0 
SKP 517 0,6 0 0,0 
ITSP 159 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 40 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 31 0,0 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 30 391 35,7 2 33,3 
SDP 26 942 31,6 2 33,3 
KOK 10 041 11,8 1 16,7 
VIHR 9 955 11,7 1 16,7 
KD 2 574 3,0 0 0,0 
PS 2 428 2,8 0 0,0 
VAS 2 163 2,5 0 0,0 
SKP 517 0,6 0 0,0 
ITSP 159 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 40 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 31 0,0 0 0,0 
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Pohjois-Savo 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 45 607 35,8 4 40,0 
SDP 24 760 19,5 2 20,0 
KOK 21 696 17,1 1 10,0 
VAS 14 253 11,2 1 10,0 
KD 10 316 8,1 1 10,0 
VIHR 5 073 4,0 0 0,0 
PS 4 334 3,4 1 10,0 
SKP 624 0,5 0 0,0 
KÖY 254 0,2 0 0,0 
SKS 100 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 90 0,1 0 0,0 
ITSP 74 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 68 0,1 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 45 607 35,8 4 40,0 
SDP 24 760 19,5 2 20,0 
KOK 21 696 17,1 1 10,0 
VAS 14 253 11,2 1 10,0 
KD 10 316 8,1 1 10,0 
VIHR 5 073 4,0 0 0,0 
PS 4 334 3,4 1 10,0 
SKP 624 0,5 0 0,0 
KÖY 254 0,2 0 0,0 
SKS 100 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 90 0,1 0 0,0 
ITSP 74 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 68 0,1 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 45 607 35,8 3 30,0 
SDP 24 760 19,5 2 20,0 
KOK 21 696 17,1 2 20,0 
VAS 14 253 11,2 1 10,0 
KD 10 316 8,1 1 10,0 
VIHR 5 073 4,0 0 0,0 
PS 4 334 3,4 1 10,0 
SKP 624 0,5 0 0,0 
KÖY 254 0,2 0 0,0 
SKS 100 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 90 0,1 0 0,0 
ITSP 74 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 68 0,1 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 45 607 35,8 4 40,0 
SDP 24 760 19,5 2 20,0 
KOK 21 696 17,1 2 20,0 
VAS 14 253 11,2 1 10,0 
KD 10 316 8,1 1 10,0 
VIHR 5 073 4,0 0 0,0 
PS 4 334 3,4 0 0,0 
SKP 624 0,5 0 0,0 
KÖY 254 0,2 0 0,0 
SKS 100 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 90 0,1 0 0,0 
ITSP 74 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 68 0,1 0 0,0 
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Satakunta 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
SDP 36 232 29,5 3 33,3 
KESK 30 377 24,7 3 33,3 
KOK 26 395 21,5 2 22,2 
VAS 14 815 12,0 1 11,1 
PS 6 392 5,2 0 0,0 
VIHR 4 292 3,5 0 0,0 
KD 2 977 2,4 0 0,0 
SSP 737 0,6 0 0,0 
SKP 357 0,3 0 0,0 
ITSP 210 0,2 0 0,0 
SKS 84 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 61 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 46 0,0 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
SDP 36 232 29,5 3 33,3 
KESK 30 377 24,7 3 33,3 
KOK 26 395 21,5 1 11,1 
VAS 14 815 12,0 1 11,1 
PS 6 392 5,2 1 11,1 
VIHR 4 292 3,5 0 0,0 
KD 2 977 2,4 0 0,0 
SSP 737 0,6 0 0,0 
SKP 357 0,3 0 0,0 
ITSP 210 0,2 0 0,0 
SKS 84 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 61 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 46 0,0 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
SDP 36 232 29,5 3 33,3 
KESK 30 377 24,7 3 33,3 
KOK 26 395 21,5 1 11,1 
VAS 14 815 12,0 1 11,1 
PS 6 392 5,2 1 11,1 
VIHR 4 292 3,5 0 0,0 
KD 2 977 2,4 0 0,0 
SSP 737 0,6 0 0,0 
SKP 357 0,3 0 0,0 
ITSP 210 0,2 0 0,0 
SKS 84 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 61 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 46 0,0 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
SDP 36 232 29,5 3 33,3 
KESK 30 377 24,7 2 22,2 
KOK 26 395 21,5 2 22,2 
VAS 14 815 12,0 1 11,1 
PS 6 392 5,2 1 11,1 
VIHR 4 292 3,5 0 0,0 
KD 2 977 2,4 0 0,0 
SSP 737 0,6 0 0,0 
SKP 357 0,3 0 0,0 
ITSP 210 0,2 0 0,0 
SKS 84 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 61 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 46 0,0 0 0,0 
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Uusimaa 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 133 885 28,7 11 32,4 
SDP 94 215 20,2 7 20,6 
KESK 57 609 12,4 4 11,8 
VIHR 50 718 10,9 4 11,8 
RKP 44 418 9,5 3 8,8 
VAS 31 324 6,7 2 5,9 
PS 27 846 6,0 2 5,9 
KD 19 157 4,1 1 2,9 
SKP 2 103 0,5 0 0,0 
SSP 1 066 0,2 0 0,0 
KÖY 802 0,2 0 0,0 
ITSP 747 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 528 0,1 0 0,0 
MUUT 413 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 369 0,1 0 0,0 
LIB 295 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 239 0,1 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 133 885 28,7 10 29,4 
SDP 94 215 20,2 8 23,5 
KESK 57 609 12,4 2 5,9 
VIHR 50 718 10,9 2 5,9 
RKP 44 418 9,5 5 14,7 
VAS 31 324 6,7 2 5,9 
PS 27 846 6,0 2 5,9 
KD 19 157 4,1 3 8,8 
SKP 2 103 0,5 0 0,0 
SSP 1 066 0,2 0 0,0 
KÖY 802 0,2 0 0,0 
ITSP 747 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 528 0,1 0 0,0 
MUUT 413 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 369 0,1 0 0,0 
LIB 295 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 239 0,1 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 133 885 28,7 9 26,5 
SDP 94 215 20,2 9 26,5 
KESK 57 609 12,4 3 8,8 
VIHR 50 718 10,9 2 5,9 
RKP 44 418 9,5 4 11,8 
VAS 31 324 6,7 2 5,9 
PS 27 846 6,0 2 5,9 
KD 19 157 4,1 3 8,8 
SKP 2 103 0,5 0 0,0 
SSP 1 066 0,2 0 0,0 
KÖY 802 0,2 0 0,0 
ITSP 747 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 528 0,1 0 0,0 
MUUT 413 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 369 0,1 0 0,0 
LIB 295 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 239 0,1 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 133 885 28,7 10 29,4 
SDP 94 215 20,2 7 20,6 
KESK 57 609 12,4 4 11,8 
VIHR 50 718 10,9 4 11,8 
RKP 44 418 9,5 3 8,8 
VAS 31 324 6,7 2 5,9 
PS 27 846 6,0 2 5,9 
KD 19 157 4,1 2 5,9 
SKP 2 103 0,5 0 0,0 
SSP 1 066 0,2 0 0,0 
KÖY 802 0,2 0 0,0 
ITSP 747 0,2 0 0,0 
KTP 528 0,1 0 0,0 
MUUT 413 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 369 0,1 0 0,0 
LIB 295 0,1 0 0,0 
STP 239 0,1 0 0,0 
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Vaasa 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 78 523 32,5 6 35,3 
RKP 49 839 20,6 4 23,5 
KOK 34 101 14,1 3 17,6 
SDP 30 720 12,7 2 11,8 
KD 16 919 7,0 1 5,9 
PS 14 454 6,0 1 5,9 
VAS 11 342 4,7 0 0,0 
VIHR 3 543 1,5 0 0,0 
ITSP 1 192 0,5 0 0,0 
SSP 851 0,4 0 0,0 
SKP 307 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 61 0,0 0 0,0 
KTP 54 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 45 0,0 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 78 523 32,5 7 41,2 
RKP 49 839 20,6 3 17,6 
KOK 34 101 14,1 2 11,8 
SDP 30 720 12,7 3 17,6 
KD 16 919 7,0 1 5,9 
PS 14 454 6,0 1 5,9 
VAS 11 342 4,7 0 0,0 
VIHR 3 543 1,5 0 0,0 
ITSP 1 192 0,5 0 0,0 
SSP 851 0,4 0 0,0 
SKP 307 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 61 0,0 0 0,0 
KTP 54 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 45 0,0 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 78 523 32,5 7 41,2 
RKP 49 839 20,6 3 17,6 
KOK 34 101 14,1 2 11,8 
SDP 30 720 12,7 3 17,6 
KD 16 919 7,0 1 5,9 
PS 14 454 6,0 1 5,9 
VAS 11 342 4,7 0 0,0 
VIHR 3 543 1,5 0 0,0 
ITSP 1 192 0,5 0 0,0 
SSP 851 0,4 0 0,0 
SKP 307 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 61 0,0 0 0,0 
KTP 54 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 45 0,0 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KESK 78 523 32,5 6 35,3 
RKP 49 839 20,6 4 23,5 
KOK 34 101 14,1 2 11,8 
SDP 30 720 12,7 2 11,8 
KD 16 919 7,0 1 5,9 
PS 14 454 6,0 1 5,9 
VAS 11 342 4,7 1 5,9 
VIHR 3 543 1,5 0 0,0 
ITSP 1 192 0,5 0 0,0 
SSP 851 0,4 0 0,0 
SKP 307 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 61 0,0 0 0,0 
KTP 54 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 45 0,0 0 0,0 
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Varsinais-Suomi 
D’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 66 793 27,4 5 29,4 
SDP 53 281 21,8 4 23,5 
KESK 38 610 15,8 3 17,6 
VAS 25 937 10,6 2 11,8 
VIHR 22 868 9,4 2 11,8 
RKP 13 369 5,5 1 5,9 
KD 11 377 4,7 0 0,0 
PS 6 168 2,5 0 0,0 
SKS 3 074 1,3 0 0,0 
SKP 916 0,4 0 0,0 
MUUT 499 0,2 0 0,0 
LIB 297 0,1 0 0,0 
ITSP 262 0,1 0 0,0 
SSP 258 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 135 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 112 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 109 0,0 0 0,0 
 
District-by-district Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 66 793 27,4 6 35,3 
SDP 53 281 21,8 3 17,6 
KESK 38 610 15,8 3 17,6 
VAS 25 937 10,6 1 5,9 
VIHR 22 868 9,4 2 11,8 
RKP 13 369 5,5 1 5,9 
KD 11 377 4,7 1 5,9 
PS 6 168 2,5 0 0,0 
SKS 3 074 1,3 0 0,0 
SKP 916 0,4 0 0,0 
MUUT 499 0,2 0 0,0 
LIB 297 0,1 0 0,0 
ITSP 262 0,1 0 0,0 
SSP 258 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 135 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 112 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 109 0,0 0 0,0 
 
Direct-distribution Roinila–d’Hondt method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 66 793 27,4 6 35,3 
SDP 53 281 21,8 3 17,6 
KESK 38 610 15,8 3 17,6 
VAS 25 937 10,6 1 5,9 
VIHR 22 868 9,4 2 11,8 
RKP 13 369 5,5 1 5,9 
KD 11 377 4,7 1 5,9 
PS 6 168 2,5 0 0,0 
SKS 3 074 1,3 0 0,0 
SKP 916 0,4 0 0,0 
MUUT 499 0,2 0 0,0 
LIB 297 0,1 0 0,0 
ITSP 262 0,1 0 0,0 
SSP 258 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 135 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 112 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 109 0,0 0 0,0 
 
D’Hondt & Hare–Niemayer method 
Party Votes Votes, % Seats Seats, % 
KOK 66 793 27,4 5 29,4 
SDP 53 281 21,8 4 23,5 
KESK 38 610 15,8 3 17,6 
VAS 25 937 10,6 2 11,8 
VIHR 22 868 9,4 1 5,9 
RKP 13 369 5,5 1 5,9 
KD 11 377 4,7 1 5,9 
PS 6 168 2,5 0 0,0 
SKS 3 074 1,3 0 0,0 
SKP 916 0,4 0 0,0 
MUUT 499 0,2 0 0,0 
LIB 297 0,1 0 0,0 
ITSP 262 0,1 0 0,0 
SSP 258 0,1 0 0,0 
KTP 135 0,1 0 0,0 
SIK 112 0,0 0 0,0 
STP 109 0,0 0 0,0 
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Appendix C. Indices of disproportionality104 
Rae index 
Rae’s index measures (dis)proportionality by calculating the average deviation between the seat 
shares and vote shares of parties, thus telling us how many seats too many or too few each party 
gained on average. The index is calculated with the formula: 
 
i
sv
I
ii 
 , where vi is a party’s vote share, si its seat share and i the number of parties. 
Example:  If I=2, then on average the seat share of each party is two percentage points higher or 
lower than their vote share. 
Loosemore–Hanby index 
The Loosemore–Hanby index measures the aggregate overrepresentation of all those parties that 
gained a larger share of seats than they did of votes. In other words it gives us the percentage of 
seats that were allocated to parties above their proportionate share. The index is calculated with 
the formula: 
2
 

ii sv
D , where vi is a party’s vote share and si its share of seats. 
Example: If the Loosemore–Hanby index gives the value D=10, then ten percent of all seats are won 
by parties whose share of seats then exceeds their share of votes. Thus it can be interpreted as telling 
us that ten percent of all seats went to the ‘wrong’ parties. 
Gallagher index 
The Gallagher least squares index (LSq) gives a numerical value ranging from 0 to 100, with a 
higher number representing greater deviation from perfect proportionality. This weighed index 
reveals the degree of politically meaningful disproportionality better than the other indices as it 
downplays the significance of many small, and often politically insignificant, deviations. The index 
is calculated with the formula: 
 
2
2
 

isv
LSq
i
, where vi is a party’s vote share and si its share of seats.  
                                                          
104 Lijphart 1994, pp. 58–62. 
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Appendix D. Party names and abbreviations 
Abbreviation Party name in Finnish Party name in English 
   
KESK Suomen Keskusta The Centre Party 
KOK Kansallinen Kokoomus The National Coalition Party 
SDP Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue The Social Democratic Party of Finland 
VAS Vasemmistoliitto The Left Alliance 
VIHR Vihreä liitto The Greens of Finland 
KD Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit The Finnish Christian Democrats 
RKP Ruotsalainen kansanpuolue The Swedish People’s Party of Finland 
PS Perussuomalaiset The Finns Party 
SKP Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue Communist Party of Finland 
SSP Suomen Senioripuolue Senior Citizens’ Party of Finland 
ITSP Itsenäisyyspuolue Independence Party 
SKS Suomen Kansan Sinivalkoiset The Blue-Whites of the Finnish People* 
LIB Liberaalit Liberals 
KÖY Köyhien Asialla For the Poor Party 
KTP Kommunistinen Työväenpuolue Communist Workers’ Party (Finland) 
STP Suomen Työväenpuolue Workers’ Party of Finland 
SIK Suomen Isänmaallinen Kansanliike The Patriotic People’s Movement of Finland* 
YVP Yhteisvastuu puolue Common Responsibility Party* 
MUUT Muut ryhmät Other groups 
   
* Party names without an official English translation. The translations presented are mine. 
